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LABOR LAW-ANTOL V ESPOSTO. THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXPANDS
PREEMPTION UNDER THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your client, a union member employed under the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, is laid off or fired in contravention
of the terms of his or her employment agreement. Although state law may
appear to provide a remedy for your client, the availability of the remedy
may be extinguished by federal law.
On its face, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (LMRA) 1 grants a federal forum for labor contract disputes, without
regard to citizenship of the parties or the amount in dispute. 2 The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 301, however, as authorizing and
requiring federal courts to create and develop a federal common law to
govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 3 This pre-
emption does not remove state court jurisdiction over actions arising
under collective bargaining agreements; rather, in some instances, it
preempts the application of state law in favor of the federal common law.
4
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
2. See id. (specifying forum in which to bring labor contract dispute). For the
text of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, see infra
note 24 and accompanying text.
3. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) ("The
question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a)?
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."); Antol
v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Although section 301 refers only
to jurisdiction, it has been interpreted as authorizing federal courts to fashion a
body of common law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.");
Laura W. Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees'Individual Employment Rights: An Argu-
ment Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEVJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (1996) (dis-
cussing Supreme Court's interpretation of section 301 as authorizing federal
courts to create governing body of federal common law to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements); Christina M. Lyons, Recent Development, Labor Law, 36 B.C.
L. REv. 307, 331-32 (1996) ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 to
require the development of a federal common law with respect to collective bar-
gaining agreements.").
4. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988)
(holding that "an application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application requires the interpreta-
tion of a collective-bargaining agreement"); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987) ("Inasmuch as federal law must control the
uniform meaning given to contract terms in a collective-bargaining agreement,
however, an employee's state-law tort action that necessarily rests on an interpreta-
tion of those terms is pre-empted by § 301."); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 215 (1985) (stating that question of federal contract interpretation is
preempted by section 301); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
(1995)
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The purposes of this federal common law are to provide "consistency and
uniformity in the interpretation and application of collective bargaining
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) ("[T]he preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to
displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization."' (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974))).
Claims that are independent of collective bargaining agreements, however,
even if between employees and employers, are not removable. See Livadas v. Brad-
shaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994) (" [W] hen liability is governed by independent state
law, the mere need to 'look to' the collective-bargaining agreement for damage
computation is no reason to hold the state law claim defeated by § 301."). The
Livadas Court (noted that "[s] ection 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt non-
negotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law," and
thus, claims that are independent of collective bargaining agreements may pro-
ceed on a state cause of action. Id. at 123; see Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 ("In other
words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on
the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the
same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting
the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-
emption purposes."); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1987)
(stating that respondent's claim was not "substantially dependent" on interpreta-
tion of collective bargaining agreement and preemption of independent state
rules would be inconsistent with congressional intent); Antol, 100 F.3d at 1117
("Claims that are independent of a collective bargaining agreement, even if they
are between employees and employers, are not removable." (citing Livadas, 512
U.S. at 123)). As one commentator noted:
Preemption is defined as a doctrine "adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local,
character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws."
Congress' power to preempt or to displace entirely any overlapping and
conflicting state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. When evaluating a preemption question, courts
must begin with a general presumption against preemption. The pre-
sumption is especially strong when the federally regulated area deals with
laws which have traditionally been left to a state's sovereignty....
Preemption may occur either by an express statutory provision or by im-
plication determined by the structure and purpose of the Act. The...
LMRA do[es] not contain express statutory preemption provisions. Thus,
absent explicit provision, the extent to which federal labor laws are in-
tended to supercede state laws depends on an analysis of the purpose and
structure of the federal act.
Nancy Abraham, Comment, Section 301 Preemption and Its Effect on an Employee's State
Rights, 1988 DET. C.L. Rxv. 735, 739-40 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 1177 (5th ed. 1960)); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) ("The presumption is against pre-emp-
tion, and we are not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in order to
enlarge their pre-emptive scope.").
It should be noted that at least one court has held that section 301 may not be
applied outside of the United States. See Christopher Downey, Section 301 of Labor
Management Relations Act May Not Be Applied Outside U.S., N.Y. LJ., July 16, 1992, at
5 (stating that appellate panel found that Congress had authority under Com-
merce Clause to provide federal forums for labor suits outside United States, but
that Congress evidenced no such intent with LMRA).
1996
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agreements" 5 and to promote arbitration as the primary means of collec-
tive bargaining agreement interpretation. 6
This change in the governing body of law can have a profound impact
on the outcome of a worker's case. Section 301 actions may be advanta-
geous for many employer defendants because they place mandatory satis-
faction of certain procedural burdens on aggrieved plaintiffs. 7 In fact,
"[t]o prevail in a section 301 action, a plaintiff must initially exhaust col-
lective bargaining grievance procedures, then file suit within a six-month
period of limitation, and ultimately prove a breach of both the collective
bargaining agreement and the union's duty of fair representation."8 Be-
cause of the heightened procedural requirements of section 301, many of
5. Lyons, supra note 3, at 331; see Stein, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that
Supreme Court has argued that allowing certain state law claims could undermine
goal of establishing single uniform body of federal law to govern interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements); see also Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (discussing policy of formation of
uniform federal law as means to avoid stimulation and prolongation of labor dis-
putes); Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115 ("An underlying reason for the development of
federal law in this area is the need for uniform interpretation of contract terms to
aid both the negotiation and the administration of collective bargaining
agreements.").
6. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410-11 (discussing federal common law as means of
enforcing arbitration agreements; and stating that by not preempting state tort
remedy, Court was consistent with policy of fostering uniform and certain adjudi-
cation of collective bargaining disputes and maintained central goal of section 301
preemption by preserving effectiveness of arbitration); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219
("The need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central rea-
sons that underlay the Court's holding in Lucas Flour."); Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at
105 (stating that use of strike as means to settle dispute that collective bargaining
agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by mandatory arbitra-
tion constitutes violation of agreement); Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115 (noting reason for
development of federal law in this area is need for uniformity in interpretation of
contract terms to aid negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreements); Stein, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that Supreme Court has reasoned
that allowing certain state law claims "could undermine the role of the arbitrator
as the principal interpreter of such agreements").
7. See Christopher P. Yates, Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Principled Response to
Removal of State Law Claims to Federal Court Based on Section 301 Preemption, 6 COOLEY
L. REV. 483, 483-84 (1989) (stating that in many cases, when plaintiffs' attorneys
fail to contest preemption based removal, they play "directly into the hands of
employers because section 301 actions require plaintiffs to satisfy a host of proce-
dural requirements"). The advantages that section 301 may confer on employer-
defendants may be seen in cases such as Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d
108 (3d Cir. 1993). In Wheeler, a former employee sued his corporate employer
and an officer of the corporation for wages due. Id. at 110. The action was based
on both state law and the LMRA. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the arbitra-
tion requirements in the collective bargaining agreement with respect to his wage
claim, he was barred from suing under section 301 (a) of the LMRA. See id. at 112.
The court further held that the plaintiff's state law claim was preempted because it
was based on a collective bargaining agreement and as such was "governed exclu-
sively by federal law." Id. at 113. Hence, the aggrieved plaintiff was never given the
chance to be heard on the merits of his claim. See id.
8. Yates, supra note 7, at 483-84 (footnotes omitted).
1997] CASEBRIEF 1997
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the preempted actions are quashed during the first round of dispositive
motions. 9 Therefore, the question of preemption can make or break a
union employee's lawsuit.10 Consequently, "section 301 preemption has
been a fruitful source of litigation over the years."1
Most recently, in Antol v. Esposto,12 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that section 301 of the LMRA preempted an
employee action against corporate employers that would otherwise have
been permitted under state law. 13 In doing so, the court refused to recog-
nize the independent nature of state law rights apart from those rights
delineated in the bargaining agreement in situations in which the collec-
tive bargaining agreement must be referenced for calculation of dam-
ages. 14 The Third Circuit further held that a state law that defined
"employer" to permit aggrieved employees to hold officers of their former
9. See id. at 484 & n.9 ("Aggrieved employees who cannot allege exhaustion of
their contractual remedies will almost certainly have their preempted claims dis-
missed for failure to exhaust." (citing Cole v. Pathmark of Fairlawn, 672 F. Supp.
796, 803 (D.NJ. 1987)); see also Wheeler, 985 F.2d at 112 (holding that plaintiff
could not sue under section 301 of LMRA because he failed to make use of exclu-
sive grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in collective bargaining agree-
ment). One commentator noted that "in most cases the district court does not
even address the exhaustion requirement because, once preempted, the plaintiffs
state law claims fall prey to § 301's six-month statute of limitations." Yates, supra
note 7, at 484 n.9 (citing Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 256 (4th
Cir. 1987)); see Barton v. Creasey Co., 718 F. Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (N.D. W. Va.
1989) (discussing six-month statute of limitations as bar to state claim); see also
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983) (hold-
ing that section 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994),
which establishes six-month period for making charges of unfair labor practices to
National Labor Relations Board, is federal statute of limitations designed to ac-
commodate balance of interests very similar to that sought by LMRA and, there-
fore, governs suits under LMRA section 301).
10. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1117-18 (holding that because suit is based squarely
on terms of collective bargaining agreement, state law claim is preempted by fed-
eral labor law and noting that federal labor law defines "employer" differently
from state law resulting in complete denial of remedy that plaintiff may have been
entitled to under federal law); Wheeler, 985 F.2d at 111-13 (holding that plaintiff's
state law claims for wages due under collective bargaining agreement were pre-
empted and governed exclusively by federal law and that plaintiff could not assert
claim under federal law because he failed to exhaust grievance and arbitration
procedures required by collective bargaining agreement).
11. Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115.
12. 100 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1996).
13. Id., at 1121 (concluding that Pennsylvania wage law is preempted by
LMRA). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Antol, see infra notes
124-84 and accompanying text.
14. See Anto4 100 F.3d at 1121 ("Federal law rests on the premise that limita-
tion of certain rights afforded by the states is justified by having a uniform labor
policy."). One commentator notes that the requirements of the dependence test
have been interpreted two different ways.- See Stein, supra note 3, at 6. Under one
interpretation, the court holds that section 301 preemption is not warranted if the
state law right is an independent public law right that can exist without any con-
tractual agreement. See id. at 6-7. A second interpretation of the dependence test
holds that preemption is mandated if resolution of the claim at issue would re-
1998
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corporate employer personally liable would alter the scope and enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements if applied to the LMRA. 15
This Casebrief discusses the development of section 301 preemption
under the LMRA in U.S. jurisprudence and, more specifically, within the
Third Circuit.16 Part II summarizes the development of section 301 pre-
emption by the Supreme Court.' 7 Part III briefly analyzes the application
and interpretation of the LMRA's section 301 preemption by other circuit
quire a court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement "in a more than de
minimis way." Id. at 7.
15. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1119-20 (stating that definition of "'employer' ...
created by state law, if applied to the Labor Management Relations Act, would
substantially alter the scope and enforcement of the typical collective-bargaining
agreement").
Although this Casebrief does not focus on the issue of employer liability under
the National Labor Relations Act, the Antol court discussed this facet of the case at
some length. The Antol court noted that "[u] nder the [Pennsylvania] Wage Law,
officers become the 'employer' and are personally liable for obligations of the cor-
porate employer." Id. at 1119. To determine if section 301 preempted the plain-
tiffs' state law claim, the Third Circuit focused on the suits in which the court
reviewed the relationship between the Pennsylvania wage law and federal labor
law. See id. This issue was first raised in Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth
R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1983). In Ambrose, the Third Circuit held
that individual officers were not liable under section 301 because there was no
proof that they were acting as alter egos of the corporation. Id. at 284. In so
holding, the court read the LMRA's definition of "employer" as narrower than that
term's meaning in the state wage law, but refused to find merit in the defendant's
argument that the state law was preempted by section 301. See id. The Third Cir-
cuit, however, has since held that the state law was preempted in contravention of
Ambrose in light of two recent Supreme Court holdings. See McMahon v. McDowell,
794 F.2d 100, 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
The Ambrose footnote was revisited by the Third Circuit in Wheeler. Wheeler, 985
F.2d at 113. In Wheeler, the plaintiffs brought an action based on both the Penn-
sylvania wage law and the LMRA. See id. at 110. The Third Circuit held that the
state action was preempted because it required interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement and that the section 301 suit was barred because the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust the arbitration requirements of the agreement. See id. at 113.
The Third Circuit, in Antol, determined that Wheeler's holding was more in line
with the Supreme Court's holding in Lueck, which contradicted Ambrose. Antol 100
F.3d at 1119-20.
The Third Circuit distinguished the Antol case as one against individual of-
ficers and shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 1119. Under the state wage law,
officers become the "employer" and were personally liable as such. See id. This
definition of the term "employer" was deemed by the Third Circuit to be in con-
flict with that of the LMRA, and if applied to the LMRA, it would drastically alter
its scope. See id. at 1119-20 ("[P] ermitting use of the Wage Law in disputes where
collective bargaining agreements are in force, undermines the uniformity of fed-
eral labor law in a critical area-enforcing wage agreements, a mandatory subject
for collective bargaining."). As a matter of policy, the Third Circuit determined
that preemption must occur in order to uphold the federal right to determine who
shall resolve contract disputes. See id. at 1120.
16. For an introductory discussion of section 301 jurisprudence, see supra
notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the development of section 301 jurisprudence within
the Supreme Court, see infra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
1997] CASEBRIEF 1999
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courts.18 Next, Part III examines the history of section 301 preemption
within the Third Circuit. 19 Part IV provides a narrative analysis of the
Third Circuit's most recent application of section 301 preemption and de-
scribes how such application may affect the ability of a legally harmed em-
ployee to seek remedies granted under state law.20 Part V discusses what a
practitioner must do when faced with section 301 preemption. 21 Finally,
Part VI considers the future of section 301 preemption and the extent to
which courts may apply section 301 to preempt rights granted under state
law in favor of federal common law. 22
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND SEcrION 301 PREEMPTION
As first adopted, the purpose of section 301 of the LMRA was to pro-
vide jurisdiction to federal courts in labor disputes and to "encourage the
making of agreements and to promote industrial peace." 23 Section 301 (a)
of the LMRA provides:
18. For a discussion of the development of section 301 jurisprudence within
jurisdictions other than the Third Circuit, see infra notes 79-98 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the development of section 301 preemption jurispru-
dence within the Third Circuit, see infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
20. For a narrative analysis of Anto4 see infra notes 124-84 and accompanying
text.
21. For a discussion of the practical applications of the analysis presented
within this Casebrief, see infra notes 185-208 and accompanying text.
22. For the conclusion of this Casebrief, see infra notes 209-12 and accompa-
nying text.
23. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957) S. REP.
No. 80-105, at 17-18 (1947). One commentator added:
It appears that Congress was troubled because it believed that it was diffi-
cult for employers to sue unions as entities in state courts to enforce con-
tracts. Thus, the purpose of [section] 301 seemed to be to provide
recourse to the federal courts to enforce contracts as a vehicle for achiev-
ing labor peace.
Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life In-
surance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength , 9 INDUS. REL. L.J.
596, 604 n.28 (1987). Additionally Senate Report 105 states:
Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and
enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a
higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and
will thereby promote industrial peace.
It has been argued that the result of making collective [bargaining]
agreements enforceable against unions would be that they would no
longer consent to the inclusion of a no-strike clause in a contract.
This argument is not supported by the record in the few States which
have enacted their own laws in an effort to secure some measure of union
responsibility for breaches of contract. Four States ... have thus far en-
acted such laws and, so far as can be learned, no-strike clauses have been
continued about as before.
In any event, it is certainly a point to be bargained over and any union...
which has bargained in good faith with an employer should have no re-
luctance in including a no-strike clause if it intends to live up to the terms
2000
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Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.2
4
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,25 however, the
United States Supreme Court interpreted section 301 as authorizing fed-
eral courts to create a substantive body of federal common law to govern
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 26 The Lincoln Mills
of the contract. The improvement that would result in the stability of
industrial relations is, of course, obvious.
S. REP. No. 80-105 at 17-18. Senate Report 105 further stated that "to en-
courage the making of agreements and to promote industrial peace through faith-
ful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting interstate
commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts." Id. at 15; see also HARRY A.
MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 17 (1950)
(reviewing growth of U.S. labor market in 1940s and 1950s and need to promote
performance of agreements); James B. Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market: A Comment
On Judicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J. 88, 92 (1985) (discussing Senate Report
105); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1957) (stating that collec-
tive bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable
in federal courts in order to promote harmony and uniformity); Archibald Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 48
(1947) (discussing transition to system of collective bargaining with hope of
achieving harmonious relationships).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. Id. at 451-52 (stating that section 301 "supplies the basis upon which the
federal district courts may take jurisdiction and apply the procedural rule of
§ 301(b)"). The Lincoln Mills Court noted that section 301's construction was va-
ried among the courts. Id. at 450. One view held that section 301 was only a grant
ofjurisdiction to federal district courts in cases involving labor organizations, with-
out respect to diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy. See id.; see also
United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.
1957) (referring to section 301, and stating that "it would seem clear that all it
does is to give procedural directions to the federal courts"); International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 1956)
("[S]ection 301 implies a normal federal-question jurisdiction to the extent pro-
vided in other statutes, all other jurisdictional requisites having been abolished in
suit by or against labor organizations .. "); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Work-
ers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) ("This statute is for the purpose
only of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases involving labor contracts.").
The other view held that section 301 was more than jurisdictional, because it
authorized federal courts to create federal law for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. See Lincoln Mills, 448 U.S. at 451; Shirley-Hermann Co. v.
International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950) (stating that
section 301 is substantive as well as jurisdictional); see also Signal-Stat. Corp. v. Lo-
cal 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1956)
(holding that section 301 creates federal substantive rights and federal jurisdiction
to enforce them); Rock Drilling Local Union No. 17 v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217
7
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Court was faced with resolving a dispute in which a plaintiff-union sought
to compel an employer to arbitrate grievances pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 27
The court below, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, found that although the district court had jurisdiction over the
suit, it had no authority based in federal or state law to grant relief.28 The
Supreme Court, however, looked to the legislative history of section 301
and found that "l[v] iewed in this light, the legislation does more than con-
F.2d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating that section 301 is substantive as well as
jurisdictional); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954) ("Section 301 (a) is a grant of federal-
question jurisdiction and thus creates a federal substantive right."); United Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1953)
("Congress, exercising its power under the commerce clause of the Constitution,
not only intended to but did create substantive rights and liabilities of parties to
collective bargaining agreements in industries affecting commerce."); Milk & Ice
Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 98 v. Gillespie Milk Prod.
Corp., 203 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1953) (assuming substantive rights were created
by section 301); Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533 (4th
Cir. 1951) (finding that section 301 confers federal jurisdiction and determining
that there is no reason why court cannot enforce federal substantive rights); Ham-
ilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union,
193 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1951) (discussing section 301 as grant of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction that creates federal substantive rights); Schatte v. Int'l Alliance of
Theatrical State Employees & Moving Picture Mach. Operators, 182 F.2d 158, 164
(9th Cir. 1950) (stating that "[s]ection 301 was not enacted merely to provide a
new forum for the enforcement of contracts theretofore enforceable solely in the
state courts .... [T]he section was designed to protect interstate and foreign
commerce by creating a new substantive liability, actionable in the federal courts,
for the breach of a collective bargaining contract" in industries having impact
upon either interstate or foreign commerce); American Fed'n of Labor v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 1950) (finding thatjurisdiction in case
did not rest on diversity, but rather on section 301, which meant that court may
enforce substantive federal rights).
After reviewing relevant legislative history, the Lincoln Mills Court held that
"the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws .... Federal inter-
pretation of the federal law will govern, not state law." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at
456-57; see Stein, supra note 3, at 3 ("The Supreme Court has interpreted section
301 as authorizing the federal courts to create a body of federal common law gov-
erning the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements."); Yates, supra note 7,
at 484-85 ("More than thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
section 301 is 'more than jurisdictional.' Rather, section 301 provides federal
courts with the power to fashion substantive law 'from the policy of our national
labor laws."' (quoting Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451, 456)); Lyons, supra note 3, at
331-32 ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 to require the develop-
ment of a federal common law with respect to collective bargaining agreements.").
27. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449 (explaining petitioner-union entered into
collective bargaining agreement in 1953 with respondent-employer and agreement
provided that grievances would be handled pursuant to specified procedures and
provided for availability of arbitration by either party as final step).
28. See id. ("[The court of appeals] held that, although the District Court had
jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the court had no authority founded either in
federal or state law to grant the relief.").
2002
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ferjurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses
a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on
behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be
best obtained only in that way." 29 The Supreme Court, therefore, deter-
mined that such enforcement should be accomplished through the appli-
cation of a federal common law in accordance with the intent of
Congress. 3
0
Since Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court and lower courts throughout
the nation have struggled with defining and applying section 301.31 In
Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,32 the
Supreme Court was faced with an action by an employer against a labor
union for damages sustained as a result of a union-initiated strike in con-
travention of a collective bargaining agreement.33 The Court held that
although state court jurisdiction is not removed by section 301 preemp-
tion, an application of state law is preempted to the extent to which it
contradicts a federal common law interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. 3
4
29. Id. at 455.
30. See id. at 457 (noting that "[it is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned. Congress has indicated by
§ 301 (a) the purpose to follow that course here." (citations omitted)).
31. For a discussion of the development of section 301 preemption by the
Supreme Court, see supra notes 23-30, infra notes 32-78 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the development of section 301 preemption within the circuit
courts, see infra notes 79-123 and accompanying text.
32. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
33. See id. at 96-98. In Lucas Flour, an employee was discharged after he had
damaged a new forklift by running it off a loading platform and onto some. rail-
road tracks. See id. at 97. This discharge sparked a union strike designed to force
the employer to rehire the discharged employee. See id. The employer brought
suit against the union seeking damages caused to the business by the strike. See id.
The strike was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement because it was an
attempt to coerce the employer to forgo its contractual right to terminate an em-
ployee for sub par work. See id.
34. See id. at 103 ("The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that sub-
stantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by
the statute."). Whether the suit brought to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement is brought in state or federal court is irrelevant. See id.; see also Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 559-60 (1968) (addressing related
concepts of preemption and removal under section 301 and explaining that ac-
tions under section 301 are controlled by federal substantive law even when
brought in state court under state law); Stein, supra note 3, at 5 ("The Court [in
Lucas Flour] declared that federal law in this area is exclusive, regardless of whether
the suit to enforce the collective bargaining agreement is brought in state or fed-
eral court. Thus, state contract law is preempted to the extent that it would other-
wise enforce and govern the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.");
Yates, supra note 7, at 485 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis of preemption and
removal under section 301 in Avco Corp.).
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The Lucas Flour Court emphasized the need for one uniform law.35
In doing so, the Court sought to avoid (1) a disruptive influence on nego-
tiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements; (2) diffi-
culties in dispute resolution under the agreement; and (3) unwillingness
to agree to contract terms providing for final dispute resolution.3 6 In light
of these considerations, the Court ruled in favor of federal preemption:
"[W]e cannot but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doc-
trines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local
rules."
37
In the same year that the Court decided Lucas Flour, it also extended
section 301's coverage beyond union plaintiffs to claims of individual em-
ployees.3 8 In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,39 the plaintiff brought a claim,
both as an individual and as a member of a union, against his employer for
breach of his collective bargaining contract.40 The Court recognized that
35. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104 ("Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting
legal concepts might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree to con-
tract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.").
36. See id., 369 U.S. at 103-04 (stating that subject matter of section 301 calls
for uniform law so as to avoid disruption of negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining agreements and difficulties with dispute resolution).
37. Id. at 104. The Court discussed the policy reasons for the federal preemp-
tion of state law in the adjudication of issues arising out of collective bargaining
agreements:
More important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly one that
calls for uniform law." The possibility that individual contract terms
might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevita-
bly exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and adminis-
tration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain
of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiat-
ing an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the ne-
cessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to
contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might
someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bar-
gain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation
under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong dis-
putes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting
legal concepts might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree
to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of
disputes.
Id. at 103-04 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)).
38. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 201 (1962) (concluding
that action of individual employees arose under section 301); see also Yates, supra
note 7, at 485 (stating that Supreme Court extended section 301 to individual
employees).
39. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
40. Id. at 195-96. The plaintiff, a building maintenance employee of Evening
News Association and member of the Newspaper Guild of Detroit, sued his em-
ployer for breach of contract when the employer did not permit the plaintiff and
his assignors to report to their jobs when a different union went on strike. See id.
During this same time period, the employer continued to allow employees not
covered under collective bargaining agreements to work and paid these employees
in full. See id. at 196. This action violated a clause in the contract stating that
2004
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there was support for the defendant's contention that this employee ac-
tion to collect damages was "not among those 'suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization.... as provided in
§ 301.141 Such support, however, was defeated in light of the Lincoln Mills
holding that section 301 was not only procedural, but substantive as well.
42
Therefore, the Court held that the claims of individual employees could
be brought under section 301.
4 3
The Supreme Court further expanded section 301 in Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck44 to preempt certain tort actions brought by employees cov-
ered under collective bargaining agreements. 45 In Lueck, the plaintiff-em-
ployee alleged bad faith in his employer's handling of his disability
claim. 46 The Court justified the expansion of section 301 preemption
through a policy set forth in Lucas Flour-the need for a uniform law to
"there shall be no discrimination against any employee because of his or her mem-
bership or activity in the Guild." Id.
41. Id. at 198 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994)).
The Court discussed one case in which a majority concluded that section 301 "did
not give the federal courts jurisdiction over a suit brought by a union to enforce
employee rights which were variously characterized as 'peculiar in the individual
benefit which is their subject matter', 'uniquely personal' and arising 'from sepa-
rate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee."' Smith, 371 U.S.
at 198 (quoting Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 460 (1954).
42. See Smith, 371 U.S. at 199 (discussing how three Justices in Westinghouse
based their decisions on view that section 301 was procedural only, not substan-
tive). Justice Frankfurter, joined byJustice Burton andJustice Minton, recognized
that if section 301 was substantive, "it would be self-defeating to limit the scope of
the power of the federal courts to less than is necessary to accomplish this congres-
sional aim." Westinghouse, 348 U.S. at 442.
43. Smith, 371 U.S. at 200. The Court discussed individual employee claims
under section 301:
The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and condi-
tions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and administra-
tion of collective bargaining contracts.... To exclude these claims from
the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the
administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished under a
uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwilling to do.
Id.
44. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
45. Id. at 219 ("Since the state tort purports to give life to these terms in a
different environment, it is pre-empted."); see Stein, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that
Court justified expansion of section 301 preemption based on need for uniform
law). As noted in Antol, "[elven though 'the state court may choose to define the
tort as "independent" of any contract questions... Congress has mandated that
federal law govern the meaning given contract terms.'" Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d
1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218-19).
46. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 206 (alleging that employer "intentionally, contemp-
tuously, and repeatedly failed to make payments under the negotiated disability
plan, without a reasonable basis for withholding the payments"). In Lueck, the
plaintiff was injured in a nonoccupational accident that occurred while carrying a
pig to a friend's house for a pig roast. Id. at 205. Under the parameters of the
collective bargaining agreement, the corporate employer was to provide benefits
for nonoccupational injuries to all union employees. See id. at 204. The plaintiff
11
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govern the interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.4 7 The Lueck Court then added the need to preserve the role and
effectiveness of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution as a second
policy-based justification. 48
Furthermore, in Lueck, the Court explained that as a general rule, any
state law cause of action that is "substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of [a collective bargaining] agreement" is preempted by section
301.49 Satisfaction of the requirements of this "dependence test" has been
a key focus in the determination of section 301 preemption. 50
An example of a dependent state law remedy is typified in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler.5 1 In Hechler, the Supreme
Court concluded that a state law tort claim for breach of duty of care to
assure workplace safety was preempted because courts would be required
felt he was being harassed by his employer and filed suit in state court for failure to
make disability payments. See id. at 205; see also Robert P. Lane, Jr., Note, Labor Law
Preemption Under Section 301: New Rules for an Old Game, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1279,
1285-86 (1989) (discussing employee's belief of harassment by Allis-Chalmers in
processing his benefit payments).
47. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 ("The interests in interpretive uniformity and
predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to
federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be sub-
ject to uniform federal interpretation.").
48. See id. at 219 (espousing policy reasons for expansion of section 301 pre-
emption found in Lucas Flour and further stating "[a] final reason for holding that
Congress intended § 301 to pre-empt this kind of derivative tort claim is that only
that result preserves the central role of arbitration in our 'system of industrial self-
government"' (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1960))). The Lueck Court feared that allowing union employees to bring
certain claims in court would undermine the role of the arbitrator by having courts
resolve employment disputes that the arbitrator could have resolved and reducing
employer incentive to agree to arbitration clauses that could easily be disregarded
by employees. See Stein, supra note 3, at 6 ("The Court feared that allowing union-
ized employees to seek redress for employment related claims in court would un-
dermine the arbitrator's role as the primary interpreter of most labor
agreements."). The Supreme Court in Lueck stated:
A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance proce-
dures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, as well as
eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law under § 301 that it
is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the
labor contract in the first instance.
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (citation omitted).
49. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220; see International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler,
481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987) (stating that state law tort action claiming that union
breached duty of care was preempted by section 301 because it was substantially
dependent on union's obligations as delineated in collective bargaining agree-
ment). The Hechler Court stated that "[t]he 'rule there set forth is that, when a
state-law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement, a plaintiff may not evade the pre-emptive force of § 301 of the LMRA
by casting the suit as a state-law claim." Id. (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220).
50. See Stein, supra note 3, at 6 ("[T] he Court has indicated that the real ques-
tion is whether resolution of the state law claim depends on the collective bargain-
ing agreement.").
51. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
2006
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to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to determine what duties
had been placed on the union. 52 Hence, any state law claim that required
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for its resolution,
would be preempted by section 301 in favor of an application of federal
law.5
3
Converse to Lueck's general rule, the Supreme Court in Caterpillar,
Inc. v. WilliamS54 held that section 301 preemption is not triggered when a
state law claim can be resolved without an interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement's terms.5 5 In Caterpillar, former employees brought
an action against their former employer for breach of their individual em-
ployment contracts under state law.56 Because state law claims were not
substantially dependent on the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, they were not preempted. 57
52. Id. at 862. In discussing the preemptive force of section 301, the Court
stated:
In order to determine the Union's tort liability, however, a court would
have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in
fact placed an implied duty of care on the Union to ensure that Hechler
was provided a safe workplace.... Thus in this case, as in Allis-Chalmers, it
is clear that "questions of contract interpretation ... underlie any finding
of tort liability."
Id. (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218).
53. See id. at 859 & n.3 (discussing preemption of state law claim by section
301). When a state law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the claim will be preempted by federal law through
section 301 of LMRA, but to extend section 301 preemption to state laws that pro-
scribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations independent of labor contract
would be inconsistent with congressional intent. See id.
54. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
55. Id. at 396 ("[A] plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is
permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law
contract rights."); see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 ("[N]ot every dispute concerning
employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.").
56. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 390 (discussing state law claim for breach of individ-
ual employment contracts based on employee downgrades, that eventually led to
termination).
57. See id. at 394. The Court stated, in pertinent part, that respondents' state
law contract claims are not "completely pre-empted" section 301 claims:
Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collec-
tive-bargaining agreements and claims "substantially dependent on analy-
sis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Respondents alleged that
Caterpillar has entered into and breached individual employment con-
tracts with them. Section 301 says nothing about the content or validity
of individual employment contracts. It is true that respondents, as bar-
gaining unit employees at the time of the plant closing, possessed sub-
stantial rights under the collective agreement, and could have brought
suit under § 301. As masters of the complaint, however, they chose not to
do so.
Moreover... respondents' complaint is not substantially dependent
upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 394-95 (citation omitted) (quoting Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859 n.3).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef
Inc.58 extended this narrow reading of section 301's preemptive power
and held that when an issue is tangential to, and requires only limited
interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, federal common law
may not preempt a state law cause of action.59 The cause of action in
Lingle arose out of an employee's claim that she was terminated for exer-
cising her rights under a state workers compensation act.60 The Lingle
Court determined that the state law claim was not preempted, even
though the Court needed to look at the collective bargaining agreement
to determine benefits and damages. 6 The Court explained its holding:
In other words, even if a dispute resolution pursuant to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on
the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without inter-
preting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the
agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes. 62
58. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
59. See id., 486 U.S. at 413 n.12 (" '[N]ot every dispute ... tangentially involv-
ing a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 .... '
(quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)); see also LMRA
Did Not Pre-empt State Defamation Action, NAT'L LJ., July 22, 1996, at B22 (discussing
circuit court holding that refused to preempt state law action because action did
not require interpretation of collective bargaining agreement, so allowing inde-
pendently brought state action did not violate principle of preemption).
60. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant's
manufacturing plant, notified the defendant that she had been injured in the
course of her employment and asked for compensation for her medical expenses
in accordance with the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/1 to 305/30 (West 1994). See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401. The plaintiff was dis-
charged by the defendant six days later for filing a false workers' compensation
claim. See id. The union that represented the plaintiff then filed a grievance pur-
suant to the collective bargaining agreement that protected the plaintiff from dis-
charge except for "proper" or 'just" cause and created a procedure for arbitration
of such grievances. See id. Pending arbitration, the plaintiff commenced an action
in state court alleging improper discharge. See id. at 402. The defendant then
removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss the case on preemption
grounds or to stay further proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. Id.
61. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. The Lingle Court noted:
Neither of the elements [of this action] requires a court to interpret any
term of a collective-bargaining agreement.... This purely factual inquiry
likewise does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-
bargaining agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is "in-
dependent" of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of "in-
dependent" that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of
the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining
agreement.
Id..
62. Id. at 409-10.
2008
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The state law claim that involves only a limited interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, therefore, will not, without more, be pre-
empted by the LMRA. 6 3
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Livadas v. Bradshaw,64 at-
tempted to reinforce and clarify its position on potentially conflicting ar-
eas of section 301 preemption jurisprudence. 65 In Livadas, the Court held
that the California Labor Commissioner's policy of denying enforcement
of certain state laws to those employed under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement was not mandated by section 301 preemption and
violated the plaintiffs rights under the National Labor Relations Act.66
Specifically, the Court found that federal labor law was not in conflict with
a state statute that imposed a monetary penalty upon employers who failed
to pay all wages due immediately upon discharge. 67
In Livadas, the Court reiterated that the mere need to look to the
collective bargaining agreement for damage computation is no reason to
hold the state claim defeated by section 301.68 The Court's position en-
sured the availability of the protections of minimum state labor standards
when such state rights are independent of those delineated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.69
63. See id. at 410-12 (discussing result reached by Court and expressing con-
cern for leaving standard labor law establishments within state power). The Lingle
Court further noted that although there may be instances in which federal law
preempts state law on the basis of subject matter of the particular law in question,
section 301 preemption says nothing about the substantive rights that a state may
provide to workers when adjudication of those state-granted rights does not de-
pend on an interpretation of those rights. Id. Section 301 preemption "merely
ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements." Id. at 409.
64. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
65. Id. at 108; Lyons, supra note 3, at 335 ("[I]n Livadas v. Bradshaw, the
United States Supreme Court reinforced and attempted to clarify its position on
these potentially conflicting areas of preemption jurisprudence.").
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994); see Livadas, 512 U.S. at 117-18 ("[T]he Com-
missioner has presented Livadas and others like her with the choice of having
state-law rights ... enforced or exercising the fight to enter into a collective-bar-
gaining agreement with an arbitration clause."). The Court further stated: "This
unappetizing choice, we conclude, was not intended by Congress . . .and cannot
ultimately be reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on the centrality of the
right to bargain collectively and the desirability of resolving contract disputes
through arbitration." Id.
67. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 117-18 (reasoning that commissioner's interpreta-
tion of LMRA was irreconcilable with Congress's statutory scheme and intent).
68. See Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1122 (3d Cir. 1996) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Livadas Court "reiterated that '[w] hen the meaning of
contract terms is not the subject of the dispute, the bare fact that a collective bar-
gaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly
does not require the claim to be extinguished'" (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at
124)).
69. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 133-34 (stating that federal labor law policy must
not be heavy-handed). The Livadas Court did not suggest that all state action tak-
ing into account any collective bargaining process or state law distinction was auto-
1997] CASEBRIEF 2009
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The Caterpillar Court enunciated a second general rule of preemption
by stating that the mere reliance on a collective bargaining agreement as a
defense to a state law claim does not result in section 301 preemption.
70
The Court reasoned that the federal question inherent in a section 301
preemption question, even when used in a defensive argument, does not
overcome the fact that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.
71
Thus, two general rules of preemption have surfaced from an analysis
of Supreme Court jurisprudence of section 301 preemption. 72 First, sec-
tion 301 preempts any state law claim that requires an analysis of the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, 73 but does not preempt a claim
that is independent of, or only tangential to, a collective bargaining agree-
matically defeated. Id. The Court noted: "It is enough that we find the
Commissioner's policy to have such direct and detrimental effect on the federal
statutory rights of employees that it must be pre-empted." Id. at 135; see Lyons,
supra note 3, at 335 ("[Livadas] reinforced the Court's position of ensuring mini-
mum state labor standards as a foundation of the system created by the federal
labor statutes."). One commentator noted: "In addition, the Court declared that
states cannot rely on section 301 of the LMRA to bypass the application of mini-
mum state labor standards to all employees in the state when the legal character of
the state right proves independent of the rights under the collective bargaining
agreement." Id.
70. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987). The Caterpillar
Court stated: "[A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into
an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one
arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be
litigated." Id. at 399; see Yates, supra note 7, at 486 (stating that, to resolve section
301 principles, federal courts have enumerated general rule that parties may not
inject federal question into what is clearly state law claim).
71. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99 (stating that, in section 301 preemption
case, plaintiff is still master of complaint). The Court in Caterpillar stated:
It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to interpret that
agreement to decide whether the state claim survives. But the presence
of a ... § 301 question, in a defensive argument does not overcome ...
[the fact that] the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.
Id. at 398.
72. For a discussion of the development of Supreme Court section 301 juris-
prudential concepts, see supra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
73. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3
(1987); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (discussing rule
that when state law claim substantially depends on analysis of collective bargaining
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ment.7 4 Second, mere reliance on a collective bargaining agreement as a
defense to a state law action does not result in section 301 preemption.
7 5
Further, a review of relevant Supreme Court cases reveals that two
policy reasons stand behind section 301 jurisprudence: (1) the need for a
uniform law to govern interpretation of the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement 76 and (2) the need to preserve the central role of arbitra-
tion as a means for dispute resolution within industrial self-government.
7 7
Despite the general rules of section 301 preemption and their correlative
public policy purposes as set forth by the Supreme Court, an evaluation of
the development of section 301 jurisprudence among the circuit courts
shows that its application has been difficult and inconsistent.
78
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' STRUGGLE
A. The Circuit Courts and Section 301 Preemption
Although this Casebrief focuses on the development and application
of section 301's "dependence" test within the Third Circuit, 79 a review of
74. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (holding that when "resolution of a state-law
claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made
between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301
claim ... or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law" (citations omit-
ted)); Eric T. Berkman, Employee's Claim for Retaliation is Preempted, MAsS. L. WKL.
Feb. 3, 1997, at 1 (reporting that "[The Plaintiff's] state law claims are preempted
... not because the collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the state
law claims asserted, but because it may be so and requires interpretation" (altera-
tion in original)); JayJudge, To Federal Court and Back:Judge Remands Ill. Case, CHI.
DAILY L. BuLL., Feb. 6, 1995, at 6 (reporting on case holding that LMRA does not
preempt state law on retaliatory discharge claims and does not serve as basis for
federal jurisdiction on such claims).
75. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99 ("[A] defendant cannot, merely by inject-
ing a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim,
transform the action into one arising under federal law.").
76. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-
04 (1962) (stating that incompatible local laws must fall to federal labor law princi-
ples to avoid possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing
legal systems); see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 ("The interests in interpretive uni-
formity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by
reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or
term be subject to uniform federal interpretation.").
77. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219 (citing Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 105) (stating that
finding of preemption of derivative tort suit preserves central role of arbitration in
industry and that need to preserve effectiveness of arbitration was central to hold-
ing in Lucas Flour).
78. See Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301 's Preemption of State Law Claims: A
Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377, 415 (1990) ("While it is clear a claim is
preempted if its resolution involves interpretation of the contract, the courts are
still struggling with determining when a claim's resolution actually will involve con-
sideration of the contract.").
79. The Supreme Court decisions discussed in this Casebrief have constructed
the parameters of section 301 preemption and the "dependence" test. For a dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court decisions that have delineated the parameters of
section 301 preemption, see supra notes 23-78 and accompanying text. In ex-
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other circuit court decisions has uncovered an inconsistent application of
section 301 preemption's "dependence" test.8 0 In fact, the Supreme
Court's ambiguous answers to the question of how much interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement is necessary before a plaintiff's state law
claims would "substantially depend" upon an interpretation of the agree-
ment have forced the lower courts to define the parameters of section 301
and to apply its "dependence" test on an ad hoc basis.81
Prior to Lueck, most lower courts allowed unionized employees to
bring actions granted by state law, at least when such actions implicated a
specific state statute that created or established the cause of action.82 Af-
ter Lueck, a majority of the federal courts of appeals interpreted the
Supreme Court's holding as a bar on employee-plaintiffs who were pro-
tected under a collective bargaining agreement from asserting state law
claims.
8 3
Disparity in appellate court interpretation of Lueck, however, became
evident in the appellate courts' determination of state-provided retaliatory
discharge claims.8 4 On one hand, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits viewed protection against retaliatory
discharge as a nonnegotiable state law right immune from section 301 pre-
emption.85 On the other hand, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits determined that retaliatory discharge
panding the application of section 301 preemption, the Supreme Court has not
been clear in its definition of a test for preemption. See Stein, supra note 3, at 3
(stating that Supreme Court has been unclear in defining when claims should be
preempted). Because of the Third Circuit's reliance upon the decisions of other
circuits and the Supreme Court for guidance in determining the application of
section 301 preemption and the definition of its "dependence" test, however, this
Casebrief reviews these decisions.
80. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 n.18 (1994) ("We are aware...
that the Courts of Appeals have not been entirely uniform .in their understanding
and application of the principles set down in Lingle and Lueck.").
81. See id. (discussing inconsistencies within federal circuits in understanding
and applying principles of section 301 preemption); Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d
20, 25 (3d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that courts have differed on exactly what consti-
tutes substantial dependence).
82. See Herman, supra note 23, at 639 (observing that before Lueck and Metro-
politan Life, majority of lower courts permitted assertion of state wrongful discharge
actions when specific statute could be pointed to as creating rights).
83. See id. at 640 (stating that most federal district courts and courts of appeals
interpreted Lueck to bar plaintiffs from asserting state wrongful discharge claims).
84. See Stephanie R. Marcus, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemption of
Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209, 217 (1989) (discussing conflict
among circuits); see also Herman, supra note 23, at 639-58 (discussing wrongful
discharge actions in lower courts after Lueck).
85. See Marcus, supra note 84, at 217 (discussing conflict among circuits); see
also Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Tech. Corp., 814 F.2d 102,
105, 107 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that employee's right under state statute was
nonnegotiable and, as such, cannot be preempted); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of
N.J., Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that employee's state-
provided retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by section 301); Peabody
Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding, in case decided
2012
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claims were preempted by section 301 because such claims were incorpo-
rated in collective bargaining agreements. 86 In an attempt to resolve this
conflict among the circuits, 8 7 the Supreme Court in Caterpillar and Lingle
redefined the scope of section 301 preemption and attempted to limit its
application by holding that when state law claims were not substantially
dependent on, or were merely tangential to, an interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, they were not preempted. 88 Hence, in Lin-
gle, the Supreme Court followed the path of the Second, Third and Tenth
Circuits. 89
After Lingle, many courts viewed the Supreme Court's decision as an
expansion of the Lueck holding.90 Post-Lingle circuit court adjudication of
prior to Lueck, that state retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by federal
law).
86. See Marcus, supra note 84, at 217 (discussing treatment of this issue by
Seventh and Eighth Circuits); see alsoJohnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 797
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that employee state law retaliatory discharge claim was
preempted); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that alleged retaliatory discharge was covered by section 301 and not state
law).
87. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 402-03 & n.1
(1988) (stating that Seventh Circuit's holding rejected petitioner's argument that
tort action was not "inextricably intertwined" with collective bargaining agreement
because outcome of claim did not depend upon interpretation of agreement and
that Seventh Circuit's favoring preemption was contrary to decisions of Second,
Third and Tenth Circuits); see also Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 107 (holding that wrong-
ful discharge was not preempted by section 301, but acknowledging conflict
among circuits); Herring, 799 F.2d at 124 n.2 (holding that plaintiffs claim was
rooted in state law and was not preempted by federal labor law); Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that state retalia-
tory discharge claim was not preempted by federal law); Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1323-
24 ("Here the action is not rooted in a collective bargaining agreement ... [and
thus] is not precluded from application here by federal courts .... ). But see
Johnson, 805 F.2d at 797 (holding state retaliatory discharge claim preempted by
section 301).
88. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (allowing state
claim to proceed because it was not substantially dependent on collective bargain-
ing agreement); see also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12 (stating that disputes that only
tangentially involve collective bargaining agreements are not necessarily pre-
empted by section 301). For a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court's
holding in Caterpillar, see supra notes 54-57, 70-71 and accompanying text. For a
more complete discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Lingle, see supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
89. Compare Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (stating that state law claims that only tan-
gentially involve collective bargaining agreement are not necessarily preempted by
section 301), with Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 107 (holding that state law claim based on
wrongful discharge was not preempted by section 301), Herring, 799 F.2d at 124 n.2
(holding state law retaliatory discharge was not preempted by section 301), and
Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1324 (noting that state law retaliatory discharge claim was not
preempted by section 301).
90. See Marcus, supra note 84, at 219. As one Commentator stated:
Lingle announced that section 301 preemption occurs when a plaintiff's
state law claim "requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining
agreement," while [Lueck] called for section 301 preemption when reso-
1997] CASEBRIEF 2013
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section 301 cases resulted in inconsistent application of preemption.9 1
Thus, one commentator noted: "While Lueck initially promoted a sweep-
ing view of preemption, the Caterpillar and Lingle decisions have resulted
in a more restrictive approach that is often inconsistent with a proper anal-
ysis and application of the Supreme Court decisions. '9 2
Recognizing the inconsistent judicial interpretations, the Livadas
Court stated "the Courts of Appeals have not been entirely uniform in
their understanding and application of the principles set down in Lingle
and Lueck."9 3 In Livadas, however, the Supreme Court stated that this case
was "not a fit occasion for us to resolve disagreements that have arisen over
the proper scope of our earlier decisions."94 The Livadas Court stated
that in order to survive section 301 preemption, the legal character of the
state right must be "independent" of the rights under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.95 The ruling in Livadas failed to clarify the boundary
at which independent state rights must yield to federal preemption and
instead used a "vague standard" which creates "the need for ad hoc judi-
cial determinations of the 'independence' of the state right."9 6 As a re-
sult, it is left up to the lower courts to determine the full scope of
lution of the claim "is substantially dependent upon analysis" of the [col-
lective bargaining agreement] terms. Under Lingle, a plaintiff's claim
could therefore be preempted if it requires [collective bargaining agree-
ment] interpretation only in assessing an employer's defense, whereas
under [Lueck] that claim would probably escape preemption because it
does not "substantially depend" on [collective bargaining agreement]
interpretation.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413).
91. See id. at 219-25 (discussing circuit court treatment of Lingle); see also
White, supra note 78, at 415 ("Despite these Supreme Court decisions, the lower
courts continue to struggle with section 301 preemption."). One commentator
noted: "Using the same Lingle preemption test, the Ninth Circuit decided a case
that seems to contradict the Sixth Circuit's reasoning." Id. at 221. Compare Smo-
larek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1331 (6th Cir. 1989) (ruling that plaintiffs
state law claim was essentially same as claim in Lingle, could be determined without
reference to collective bargaining agreement and therefore was not preempted by
section 301), with Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
depended on interpretation of collective bargaining agreement and is preempted
under section 301).
92. White, supra note 78, at 415 n.167 (citing Smolarek, 879 F.2d at 1326; Nel-
son v. Central Ill. Light Co., 878 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1989); Bettis v. Oscar Mayer
Foods Corp., 878 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1989); Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766
(6th Cir. 1989)); see Mark A. Casciari & Kay Ann Hoogland, Passing a Baton to the
States-The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of Federal Regulation of Employee Benefits
Plans, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 367, 367 (1989) (discussing trend toward increased
state regulation of traditional labor and employment matters).
93. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 n.18 (1994).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 123-24; Lyons, supra note 3, at 339.
96. Lyons, supra note 3, at 339-40 (discussing balance between minimum state
rights and section 301 principles).
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"dependence" under section 301.97 Consequently, determinations of "de-
pendence" have not been consistent among the circuits. 98
Supreme Court precedent and circuit court treatment of section
301's "dependence" test provided an essential background upon which
the Third Circuit relied in fashioning an application of section 301. This
Casebrief now examines the Third Circuit's treatment of section 301 and
its application of the "dependence" test in determining the appropriate-
ness of preemption.
B. The Third Circuit and Section 301 Preemption
In 1954, in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,9 9 the Third Circuit recognized that section 301 "seemingly
indicat(ed] that Congress intended to preempt to the federal courts litiga-
tion on collective bargaining contracts." 10 0 Since that time, the Third Cir-
cuit, like other circuit courts, has struggled with the expansion and
delineation of section 301 preemption in accordance with vague Supreme
97. See Stein, supra note 3, at 16 (stating that issue of "how much contract
interpretation is too much" has been left in confused state).
98. See Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Not surpris-
ingly, case law has not been completely consistent, particularly when state law may
affect the outcome."); Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 87 F.3d 717, 720-21 (5th Cir.
1996) (stating that "labor dispute over termination pay cannot be divorced from
the Oilers' conduct in forcing the players to choose between the terms of termina-
tion and an excessively demanding rehabilitation program," and thus, players
claims were "too dependent" on analysis of collective bargaining agreement to
avoid section 301 preemption); Papell v. Loomis Armored, Inc., No. 95-15704,
1996 WL 539122, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996) (holding that employee's defa-
mation claim against employer was preempted because it was "'inextricably inter-
twined' with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agreement");
Montag v. Aerospace Corp., No. 95-55674, 1996 WL 454544, at *1, *4 (9th Cir.
Aug. 12, 1996) (concluding that two of plaintiffs claims were preempted because
they required interpretation of collective bargaining agreement, but allowing
plaintiff to proceed in state court because two federal claims were dismissed).
99. 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), affd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
100. Id. at 630 n.16. This was an action for construction of a collective bar-
gaining agreement and enforcement of the rights of employees under the agree-
ment. See id. at 624-25. It should be noted that this case, which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, was decided three years before the Supreme Court decided Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450 & n.2 (1957). Compare Westing-
house, 210 F.3d at 623 (noting that Third Circuit handed down decision in 1954),
with Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450 & n.2 (citing, in 1957, Third Circuit's decision in
Westinghouse as holding that section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act is
more than jurisdictional and authorizes federal courts to create a body of federal
law for enforcement of collective bargaining agreement). In fact, Westinghouse was
the first suit brought under section 301 to be decided by the Supreme Court. See
Lane, supra note 46, at 1281-82 & n.22 ("The first suit to be brought under section
301 produced a divided Court that seemed to agree on only one aspect of the
preemption doctrine: section 301 authorizes suits in federal court for violation of
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement."). The Court considered, but did
not resolve, whether section 301 was merely jurisdictional or was truly substantive.
See id. at 1281-82.
1997] CASEBRIEF 2015
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Court dictates.10 1 Indeed, Third Circuit jurisprudence regarding section
301 preemption generally has followed the dictates of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence and has favored an ad hoc application of section 301 in nar-
rowly defining "independent" state law claims in an effort to recognize the
federal common law. 10 2 Despite the Third Circuit's efforts toward consis-
tent section 301 jurisprudence, a brief examination of several of the sec-
tion 301 cases decided by the Third Circuit reveals a pattern of confusion.
In Berda v. CBS Corp.,10 3 the Third Circuit held that an employee's
claims were not preempted by federal law.' 0 4 The Third Circuit consid-
ered whether state contract and tort claims for monetary relief could with-
stand section 301 preemption even though they were brought by an
employee who was covered by a collective bargaining agreement and were
brought against an employer for misrepresentations that the employer
made before the employee was covered by the agreement. 10 5 The Third
101. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115-16 (discussing Supreme Court case law, but
finding it inconclusive for resolution of issue at hand).
102. See id. at 1117 (holding that suit requiring court to look at collective
bargaining agreement to determine wages owed is based "squarely on the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement" thereby applying broad definition of "depen-
dence" test); Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff's state law claim for wages allegedly due under collective
bargaining agreement was preempted by section 301 because it was based squarely
on terms of collective bargaining agreement). But see Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d
20, 27 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that claims based on state law do not "substan-
tially depend" on analysis of terms of collective bargaining agreement). In Berda,
the Third Circuit cited the Lueck Court opinion and noted that the Supreme Court
"stated that state tort claims would be preempted only if 'inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.' Taking this phrase in the
context of the whole opinion, we believe that the Court intended this as a state-
ment equivalent to 'substantial dependence.'" Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)).
103. 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 26 ("[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that section 301 does
not preempt state contract causes of action premised on pre-employment agree-
ments that are advantageous to the employee.").
105. See id., at 21. While employed as a technician in Pittsburgh, Berda met
with employees of Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) to discuss the possibility
of future employment with CBS in Washington, D.C. See id. Berda allegedly was
told at this meeting that he would be guaranteed employment with CBS for the
reasonably foreseeable future, and the job would be a permanent position. See id.
CBS then offered Berda the job, and relying on the promises of the CBS employ-
ees, Berda and his wife moved to Washington so that he could begin work as a CBS
technician there. See id. Shortly after beginning work for CBS, Berda joined the
International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, and his employment was covered
by the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. The
agreement contained a provision that stated that any "[l]ayoffs caused by a reduc-
tion of staff shall be made in the inverse order of seniority." Id. Less than five
months after Berda began working for CBS, he was laid off during a company-wide
reduction in force. See id. Berda claimed that CBS had determined to conduct
wide-scale layoffs within his department before his initial meeting with them to
discuss future employment. See id. Hence, Berda claimed that the CBS employees
with whom he met "knew or should have known that their promises and represen-
tations to him were false." Id.
2016 [Vol. 42: p. 1995
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Circuit recognized that the issue was "circuit-splitting."1 0 6 Although the
circuits agreed that claims were preempted only to the extent that they
"substantially depended" on the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, "the courts have differed on the more particular question
whether in fact there would be substantial dependence in the case before
them. On similar facts they reach different answers."1 0 7 In Berda, the
Third Circuit determined that Caterpillar demanded a narrow reading of
"dependence" in favor of avoiding state law preemption. 10 8
Contrary to its decision in Berda, in Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp.,10 9
the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's state law claim for wages alleg-
edly due under a collective bargaining agreement was preempted by sec-
tion 301.110 First, the Third Circuit applied the dependence test broadly,
holding that the state law claim was preempted because it was "based
squarely on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement" and, thus,
Berda then filed a claim in state court, alleging breach of contract and tor-
tious misrepresentation. See id. Although Berda's complaint did not refer to the
collective bargaining agreement, CBS, stating that the suit was preempted by sec-
tion 301, removed the case to federal district court alleging diversity jurisdiction
and federal question jurisdiction. See id. The district court held that a resolution
of Berda's state law claims was "substantially dependent" upon an analysis of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, the claims were pre-
empted by section 301. Id. at 22. The district court then dismissed the action
because it was not filed within the LMRA's six-month statute of limitations. See id.
106. See id. at 25. The Third Circuit noted that the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have allowed similar state law fraud
and contract claims to go forward when based on pre-employment misrepresenta-
tions by an employer. See id.; Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 804 F.2d 638, 640
(11th Cir. 1986) (allowing state fraudulent misrepresentation claims to go forward
based on pre-employment employer misrepresentations); Anderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 803 F.2d 953, 955-59 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing both state fraud and contract
claims to go forward when based on alleged pre-employment misrepresentations
by employer). The Ninth Circuit, however, maintained that state fraudulent mis-
representation claims arising from alleged pre-employment misrepresentations are
preempted by section 301. See Berda, 881 F.2d at 25 (citing Bale v. General Tel.
Co., 795 F.2d 775, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that state law claim of pre-
employment misrepresentation was preempted by section 301 before Supreme
Court's decision in Caterpillar)); see also Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830
F.2d 993, 997 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) ("No later Supreme Court decision has under-
mined our analysis in Bale [that pre-employment misrepresentation claim was pre-
empted by section 301] and therefore [we are] not at liberty to reexamine that
precedent without convening an en banc panel.").
107. Berda, 881 F.2d at 25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. See id. at 26 ("Because the contract count of Berda's complaint is not
substantially dependent on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
under Caterpillar, his contract claims are not preempted under section 301.").
109. 985 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 113; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (hold-
ing that section 301 preempts claims that are "substantially dependent upon analy-
sis of the terms" of collective bargaining agreement); National Metalcrafters v.
McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 820, 828 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal labor law
preempted employee's claim under state law for vacation benefits allegedly due
under terms of collective bargaining agreement).
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was governed exclusively by federal law.'1 1 Second, the plaintiff's section
301 suit was barred because of his failure to exhaust the arbitration re-
quirements in the collective bargaining agreement."1
2
In Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 13 the Third Circuit held that
the resolution of an employee's contract and tort claims was not "substan-
tially dependent" upon an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement
and, therefore, was not preempted by section 301.114 In Trans Penn, the
employees alleged that their corporate employer induced them to decer-
tifyi their union through contractual promises of job security that were
later breached when six employees were terminated. 115 The Third Circuit
recognized that "the mere existence of a collective bargaining agreement
does not prevent an individual from bringing state law claims based on
some independent agreement or obligation." 116 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit stated that a plaintiff may bring a state law tort action provided that
111. See Wheeler, 985 F.2d at 113 (applying dependence test broadly and pre-
empting state law claim).
112. See id. at 111; see also Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981) ("An
employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of collective bargaining agree-
ment between his union and employer must attempt to exhaust any exclusive
grievance and arbitration procedures established by the agreement before he [or
she] may maintain a suit against his union or employer under § 301."); Angst v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1536 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff must
first exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures under collective bargaining
agreement before claim can go forward).
113. 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 220 ("We hold that resolution of the employees' contract and tort
claims is not substantially dependent upon an analysis of the collective bargaining
agreement and therefore section 301 does not require preemption.").
115. Id. Trans Penn, a corporation engaged in manufacturing industrial wax
products, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Oil, Chemical,
and Atomic Worker's International Union ("OCAWI") in which Trans Penn recog-
nized OCAWI as the exclusive representative of all full-time employees at the cor-
porate plant. See id. at 220-21. Several months later, a majority of the union
members voted to decertify OCAWI as their bargaining representative. See id. On
the eve of this election, Trans Penn gave the employees a written contract guaran-
teeing employment and job security. See id. Five months later, Trans Penn termi-
nated six of these employees. See id. These employees then filed an action in state
court alleging breach of contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress
and Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(e) (1994), violations. See id.
116. Trans Penn, 50 F.3d at 229; see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
396 (1987) (holding that "a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement,
is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law
contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining
agreement"). The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Lueck further
held that not every suit "concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provi-
sion of a collective bargaining agreement" is necessarily preempted by section 301
of the LMRA. Trans Penn, 50 F.3d at 229 n.12 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12).
But see The Week's Opinions, MAss. LAw. WKLY., Sept. 23, 1991, at 9 (reporting that
appellate court held that district court below had jurisdiction under section 301 to
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the claim did not require, or was not dependent on, an interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. 117 Central to the Third Circuit's
holding was the fact that "the collective bargaining agreement is 'of no
consequence because [the employees] need not refer to ... the collective
bargaining agreement in order to make out [their] claim."' 118 This lan-
guage may suggest that were the employees' claims even slightly depen-
dent on a nominal interpretation of the terms of the agreement, the Trans
Penn court may have been overwhelmingly in favor of preemption and a
broad application of the "dependence" test.1 19
The past decade has borne witness to an explosion of labor law litiga-
tion implicating section 301 preemption issues within the Third Circuit.1 20
117. See Trans Penn, 50 F.3d at 229 (discussing when plaintiff may bring state
law tort action against employer).
118. Id. at 231 (quoting Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1989)).
119. See id. at 230-31 & n.13 (discussing appropriate application of depen-
dence test in section 301 preemption suits). Trans Penn asserted that the employ-
ees' claims were "inextricably intertwined with and substantially dependent on the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 230 (citing Angst v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992); Darden v. United States Steel Corp.,
830 F.2d 1116 (11 th Cir. 1987)). The Third Circuit distinguished Angst from Cater-
pillar and Berda, stating that, in Angst, the state law claims depended upon an inter-
pretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, whereas in Caterpillar
and Berda, the plaintiffs were not subject to collective bargaining agreements. See
id. at 230 n.13. The Third Circuit noted, however, that not all claims occurring
while one is subject to a collective bargaining agreement are preempted by section
301. See id.
The Third Circuit then distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Darden
as one that only found that the employee's state law claims would be preempted
by section 301 because their resolution depended on an examination of the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement. See id. The Third Circuit noted with ap-
proval that the Darden court stated that because the "plaintiffs actually allege a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement in their complaints.., it is disin-
genuous for them now to maintain that their claims are not 'inextricably inter-
twined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.'" Id. (quoting Lueck,
471 U.S. at 213)). Such language may be interpreted as favoring a broad interpre-
tation and application of the "dependence" test.
120. See Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
employee's suit for wages due was based squarely on terms of collective bargaining
agreement so as to be preempted in favor of federal law by section 301); Penn-
sylvania Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Educ. Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797, 800-04, 807-08 (3d
Cir. 1996) (holding that section 301 of LMRA did not preempt nurses' union's
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deceit claims against former labor representa-
tives because of characterization of plaintiff's claim as assertion of "legal rights
independent of that agreement" (emphasis added)); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
57 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing section 301's civil enforcement provi-
sions); Trans Penn, 50 F.3d at 232 (holding LMRA did not preempt contract and
tort claims that were deemed not substantially dependent upon analysis of terms of
collective bargaining agreement); Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union,
36 F.3d 306, 310 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing doctrine of complete preemp-
tion under section 301); Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d 108, 113 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that section 301 of LMRA preempted former employee's claim
for additional wages under state law because claim was based squarely on terms of
collective bargaining agreement and therefore was governed exclusively by federal
law); Angst, 969 F.2d at 1536-38, 1541 (holding resolution of plaintiff's claim pre-
1997] 2019
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Generally, the trend in the Third Circuit, as well as in most other circuits,
involves an application of the "dependence" test on an ad hoc basis.1 21 In
particular, the Third Circuit's recent treatment of section 301's "depen-
dence" test evidences this trend. 12 2 In order to gauge when the Third
Circuit will preempt state law as being dependent upon an interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement, one needs to review the court's most
recent decision concerning section 301.123
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DEFINES THE SCOPE OF SECTION 301 IN
ANTOL V. ESPOSTO
A. Majority Opinion
Recently, in Antol v. Esposto, the Third Circuit faced the issue of
whether reference to the collective bargaining agreement for the purpose
of damage calculation triggers section 301 preemption after liability has
been established under state law.124 Because any action requiring "inter-
pretation" of a collective bargaining agreement is subject to section 301
preemption, 125 the Third Circuit was essentially asked to define the scope
of the phrase "dependent upon an interpretation" within the parameters of
empted by section 301 because it substantially depended upon analysis of terms of
collective bargaining agreement and discussing necessity of exhausting grievance
and arbitration procedures before going forward with complaint in federal court);
Berda, 881 F.2d at 25 (holding employee's claims were not preempted in circuit-
splitting question of whether state contract and tort claims for monetary relief
bought by union against employer were preempted, even though they were based
on alleged misrepresentations of job security made before employee was repre-
sented by union); Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Div., 805 F.2d
110, 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that section 301 was not implicated because
plaintiff failed to state cause of action); Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d 909, 913 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding employee's state law tort claims were independent of and,
therefore, did not interfere with collective bargaining agreement and were not
preempted by section 301); Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Am-
brose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing Ambrose argument for
preemption under LMRA).
121. For a discussion of the application of the "dependence" test on an ad
hoc basis, see supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of the explosion of section 301 preemption litigation in
the Third Circuit, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Antol v. Esposto, see
infra notes 124-84 and accompanying text.
124. SeeAntol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing plain-
tiffs' assertion that "once liability is established under state law, reference to the
collective bargaining agreement for calculation of damages does not trigger
preemption.").
125. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988)
(stating that "as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the
agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption
purposes" (emphasis added)). For a discussion of why actions requiring an "inter-
pretation" of the collective bargaining agreement are considered "dependent" on
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section 301.126 More specifically, the court considered whether section
301 preempted an employee action for unpaid wages, liquidated damages
and attorney's fees that were permitted under Pennsylvania state law.
127
In Antol, 111 terminated employees of Shannopin Coal Company
brought suit against individual corporate officers and' shareholders for
wages owed by the corporate employer under Pennsylvania state law.
1 28
The former employees brought the suit in a state court of common pleas
to collect wages earned by and guaranteed to the plaintiffs under their
employment contract with Shannopin. 129 The plaintiffs based their claim
on the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law130 and attempted
to recover liquidated damages and attorney's fees as well as unpaid
wages. 13 1 Attached to the plaintiffs' complaint was a schedule of the
amounts claimed and the capacity under which they were owed.
13 2
The defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis that
the employment contract under which they were being sued was, in fact, a
collective bargaining agreement that should be enforced under section
301 of the LMRA. 133 The magistrate judge determined that the plaintiffs'
claims required an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
and, thus, were governed by section 301, rather than state law.1 34 The
judge further held that the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their contrac-
tual remedies under the collective bargaining agreement and recom-
126. See generally Antol, 100 F.3d at 1117 (stating that suit was based "squarely
on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement" and "the plaintiffs alleged
entitlement to compensation and benefits is disputed and cannot be discerned
without analyzing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement").
127. See id. at 1121 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (discussing issue of proper ap-
plication of section 301).
128. Id. at 1114 (stating that suit was brought under law in Pennsylvania pro-
viding for wage payment and collection). Shannopin had filed for bankruptcy on
September 31, 1991 and continued to operate its business until July 24, 1992. See
id. On that date, the plaintiffs were laid off, still being owed wages earned during
the bankruptcy proceeding. See id.
129. See id. ("In May 1995, plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas
of Greene County, Pennsylvania for the wages due and . . . 'several categories of
vacation pay.., all of which were wages guaranteed to and earned by the plaintiffs
as part of their contract of employment with [Shannopin].'").
130. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260 (West 1992).
131. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1114 (asserting claim under Pennsylvania law).
132. See id. (describing plaintiffs' complaint). Damages were claimed as
amounts in the categories of "wages, regular vacation, graduated vacation, floating
and sick/personal." Id.
133. See id. (asserting that "contract of employment" referred to in plaintiffs'
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mended that summary judgment and dismissal be granted for the
defendants.1 3 5 The district judge adopted these recommendations.] 36
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs first contended that
their claims were independent of the collective bargaining agreement.' 37
Coupled with this contention was the assertion that reference to the col-
lective bargaining agreement for the sole purpose of damage calculation
was not an "interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement" and,
therefore, did not trigger section 301 preemption.1 3 8 The plaintiffs finally
asserted that the ruling of the district court discriminated against union
employees. 1 39 In response, the defendants contended that federal law
preempted the state statute because the plaintiffs' claims for wages and




In arriving at its holding, the Third Circuit first reviewed the develop-
ment of section 301 jurisprudence within the Supreme Court. 1 4  The
court noted, as stated in Lincoln Mills, that section 301 allows federal
courts to create a body of federal common law to govern collective bar-
gaining agreements." 4 2 The Third Circuit stated that 'the development of
this federal law was supported by policy needs for uniform interpretation
of agreement terms and to help develop and enforce the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements.1 43
135. See id. ("He therefore recommended that summaryjudgment be granted
as to those defendants who had filed appropriate motions and that the action be
dismissed as to those defendants who had not joined in the motions.").
136. See id. at 1114-15.
137. See id. at 1115 ("On appeal, plaintiffs contend that their claims are in-
dependent of the collective bargaining agreement, that once liability is established
under state law, reference to the collective bargaining agreement for calculation of
damages does not trigger preemption, and that the district court's ruling discrimi-
nated against union employees.").
138. Id. (discussing plaintiffs' assertion that referencing collective bargaining
agreement for damage calculation is not equivalent to "interpretation").
139. See id. at 1115 (complaining of discrimination against union employees).
140. See id. (discussing defendant's contention that plaintiffs' claims required
interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
141. See id. at 1115-17 (discussing Supreme Court development of section 301
preemption jurisprudence).
142. See id. at 1115 ("Although section 301 refers only to jurisdiction, it has
been interpreted as authorizing federal courts to fashion a body of common law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements."); see also Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
143. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115 (citing Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v..
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962)); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1988) (stating that federal common law fosters
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The Third Circuit recognized that although section 301 preemption
is powerful, its general principles are not easily extrapolated or applied to
specific cases. 144 Moreover, not all state law causes of action are pre-
empted. 145 The Third Circuit focused on Lingle's recognition that section
301 does not preempt state law when litigation of a plaintiff's cause of
action does not require an interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.1 46 In other words, the Third Circuit recognized that if a claim can
be resolved independently of an interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement, then the state law is not preempted. 147 If, however, the state
law remedy is dependent on an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, it is supplanted by federal law through section 301.148
The Third Circuit used Caterpillar as an example of an "independent"
claim. 149 The Third Circuit noted that in Caterpillar, a breach of contract
suit that was outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, an
interpretation of the agreement was unnecessary to establish the plaintiffs'
case.1 50 The Third Circuit stated that the "'independent' nature of the
144. See generally, Stein, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing difficulties with section
301 preemption and stating "[i]n expanding section 301 preemption to apply to
certain individual employment rights claims asserted by employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements . . . the Court did not clearly define the test for
preemption").
145. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115 (stating that federal principles draw no clear
lines of demarcation and as result "case law has not been completely consistent,
particularly where state law may affect the outcome"). The Third Circuit observed
that "'the preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state
cause of action "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation." Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, not withstanding the fact
that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.'" Id. at 1115
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
23 (1983)). The powerful impact of section 301, however, is lessened by Lingle's
holding that courts could determine state labor law actions provided that such
matters were beyond any arbitration of the collective bargaining agreement. See
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-11 (stating that federal preemption of state law action is not
permitted "when adjudication of [plaintiffs'] rights does not depend upon the in-
terpretation of such agreements").
146. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115 (discussing Lingle Court's conclusion that em-
ployee could enforce state statute even though employee was covered by collective
bargaining agreement).
147. See id. (stating that Lingle Court noted that section 301 preemption is not
implicated to address substantive rights state may provide to workers "when adjudi-
cation of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such
agreements").
148. See id. at 1115-16 (discussing how section 301 ensures that federal law will
govern interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and that section 301 is
applied to preempt state law action when state law remedy requires interpretation
of collective bargaining agreement and is therefore dependent on interpretation
of collective bargaining agreement).
149. See id. at 1116 (discussing independent nature of plaintiff's claims as de-
ciding factor in Caterpillar). For a discussion of Caterpillar, see supra notes 54-57,
70-71 and accompanying text.
150. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1116 (stating that "construction of that agreement
was unnecessary to establish the plaintiffs' case").
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plaintiffs' claim was the deciding factor" in determining that the state law
action would not be preempted by section 301.151
The Third Circuit focused on Hechler as an example of a "dependent"
claim. 15 2 The Third Circuit noted that in this employee common law tort
suit against a union, an interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment was necessary to establish the plaintiffs case. 153 In Hechler, the plain-
tiffs case charged that her union had failed to fulfill its duty of providing
safe working conditions as it had promised in the collective bargaining
agreement.1 5 4 The Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs claim was preempted because the case was "de-
pendent" on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 155
According to the Third Circuit, such an interpretation was necessary to
determine the nature and scope of the duty at issue and to determine
whether such a duty was placed on the union. 156
The Antol court also discussed the expansion of federal law preemp-
tion in Lueck, in which a plaintiff alleged bad faith in the handling of a
disability claim. 157 The Third Circuit stated that because "the right as-
serted derived from the contract and was defined by the contractual obli-
gation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability inevitably involved
contract interpretation," thus triggering section 301 preemption. 158 Even
if the state defines the tort action as "independent" of the contract action,
Congress has determined that federal law should supercede the state
action.159
151. See id. (discussing association between preemption and independent na-
ture of plaintiffs' claim).
152. See id. (discussing differences between independent and dependent
claims). The Third Circuit stated that in Caterpillar, the plaintiffs' claim was
outside of the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, making the claim in-
dependent of the agreement and rendering it unnecessary to interpret the agree-
ment to establish the plaintiffs' case. See id. Hechler was used as an example of a
dependent claim because the courts would be required to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement to determine if a duty of providing safe conditions in the
workplace had been placed on the union and if the agreement delineated the
nature and scope of that duty. See id. (citing International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987)). For a discussion of Hechler, see supra notes 51-53
and accompanying text.
153. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1116 (stating plaintiffs'. cause was dependent upon
interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
154. See id. (citing Hechler, 481 U.S. at 853) (stating that plaintiff was electro-
cuted when her employer assigned her to perform tasks allegedly beyond scope of
her training and experience).
155. See id. at 1116 (discussing matter by which "dependent" claims are
preempted).
156. See id. (stating that contract interpretation questions precede any finding
of tort liability).
157. See id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). For a
discussion of Lueck, see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
158. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1116.
159. See id. ("Even though 'the state court may choose to define the tort as
"independent" of any contract questions... Congress has mandated that federal
2024 [Vol. 42: p. 1995
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 5 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss5/8
1997] CASEBRIEF' 2025
The Third Circuit next recognized a limitation placed on section 301
preemption in Livadas.360 In Antol, the Third Circuit noted that in
Livadas, there was no dispute over the amount of the penalty to which the
employee was entitled.16 1 The Supreme Court held that in such a case,
federal law was not in conflict with a state statute that imposed a monetary
penalty for each day that passed between an employee's termination and
receipt of wages due. 162 The Antol court realized that in reaching this
conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that "'the mere need "to look"
to the collective-bargaining agreement for damage computation is no rea-
son to hold the state claim defeated by § 301."'163
From a review of the Supreme Court cases, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that claims based on a collective bargaining agreement, or requir-
ing an interpretation thereof, were preempted by section 301.164 The
Third Circuit stated: "Claims that are independent of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, even if they are between employees and employers, are not
removable" or preempted. 1
65
2. The Third Circuit Rejects a Reading of Livadas That Would Require the
State Action to Stand
The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Livadas re-
quired the state action to stand. 16 6 The court in Antol distinguished
Livadas because there was neither a need to refer to the collective bargain-
ing agreement to calculate damages, nor was there any assertion of an
interference with the arbitral process.' 67 Furthermore, in Livadas, the em-
law govern the meaning given contract terms.'" (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218-
19)).
160. See id. (discussing ways in which scope of section 301 was narrowed by
Livadas).
161. See id. at 1116-17 (stating "that [t]he Supreme Court emphasized that
there was no dispute over the amount of the penalty to which the employee was
entitled" (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994))).
162. See id. (noting that employee in Livadas sued for amount equivalent to
lost wages for three days that had passed between her discharge and her receipt of
check from her former employer).
163. Id. (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125) (considering computation of
damages in cause of action for breach of collective bargaining agreement).
164. See id. at 1117 ("In general, claims based squarely on a collective bargain-
ing agreement or requiring analysis of its terms are preempted by section 301 and
are removable to the federal courts."); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481
U.S. 851, 859 (1987); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 215; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
165. Antol, 100 F.3d at 1117 (discussing treatment of claims independent of
collective bargaining agreement.)
166. See id. at 1120-21 ("Nor do we accept the plaintiffs' argument that
Livadas requires a different result here.").
167. See id. (noting that in Anto4 there were contested factual questions about
plaintiffs' eligibility for certain benefits based on collective bargaining agreement
that "are proper grist for the arbitration mill").
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ployee could not bypass arbitration by relying on the state statute as in
Antol.168 The Third Circuit also distinguished Livadas on other grounds,
noting that in Antol there were questions about eligibility for, and correct
amounts of, payment.169 Finally, the Third Circuit claimed that the stat-
ute in Lividas did not impose individual liability on corporate officers and
agents, whereas the statute in Antol did. 170
B. Dissenting Opinion
In a compelling dissent, Judge Mansmann determined that Livadas
allowed the plaintiffs to bring their state law claim without fear of section
301 preemption. 171 According to Judge Mansmann, the Supreme Court
in Livadas held that an employee's action based on a state law right to
recover a penalty from an employer was not preempted by section 301,
even though the penalty was attached to the plaintiffs wages that were
governed by a collective bargaining agreement. 172 Judge Mansmann as-
serted that the Livadas Court, relying on Lueck and Lingle, held that sec-
tion 301 should not be read so broadly that it preempts nonnegotiable
state rights conferred to employees as a matter of state law. 173 The Livadas
Court also stressed that a claim's characterization as "independent" of the
collective bargaining agreement was what allowed the state law action to
168. See id. ("Livadas did not present the situation found in the case at hand
where an employee could bypass arbitration by resorting to the statute.").
169. See id. ("Moreover, the employer here insists that there are uncertainties
about eligibility for the types of vacation pay, as well as the correct amounts due in
those instances."). Judge Mansmann, however, argued that the majority's distinc-
tion of Livadas was without merit because it would allow federal preemption to
turn on whether or not an employer chooses to dispute the amount of damages
that an employee is entitled to receive under state law. See id. at 1123 (Mansmann,
J., dissenting). To accept the majority's distinction "would mean that an employer
could utilize section 301 preemption to avoid liability by raising a dispute concern-
ing the amount of wages owed in any given case." Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of Judge Mansmann's dissenting opinion in Antol, see infra notes
171-84 and accompanying text.
170. See Antol, 100 F.3d at 1119-21 (discussing individual liability of corporate
officers under Pennsylvania statute).
171. See id. at 1121-22 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the employ-
ees' [state law] claims are not preempted .... The Supreme Court's decision in
Lividas v. Bradshaw guides my decision." (citation omitted)).
172. See id. at 1122 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("In Livadas, the Supreme
Court held that an employee's action based upon a state law right to receive a
penalty payment from her employer was not preempted under the LMRA even
though the penalty was tacked to her wages, which were governed by a collective
bargaining agreement."). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Livadas, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
173. SeeAntol, 100 F.3d at 1122 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) ("Relying upon its
prior decisions in [Lueck] and [Lingle], the Court held that section 301 could not
be read broadly to preempt non-negotiable rights conferred upon individual em-
ployees as a matter of state law.").
2026 [Vol. 42: p. 1995
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go forward. 174 Judge Mansmann noted that the Livadas Court stated
"'[w]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of the dispute,
the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement will be consulted in
the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be
extinguished.'-"175
Judge Mansmann found Livadas to be dispositive to the case at bar
and stated that wages sought under the state law in Antol were identical to
those provided by California state law in Livadas.176 According to Judge
Mansmann, this statutory remedy supplements, not supplants, the com-
mon law breach of contract action.1 77 Judge Mansmann found the major-
ity's distinction of Livadas unpersuasive because it based federal
preemption on whether an employer chose to argue the amount of dam-
ages a plaintiff was due under state law.'
78
Furthermore, Judge Mansmann claimed that the defendants had
failed to show that the plaintiffs' proper compensation could not be dis-
cerned without an "interpretation" of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.179 Relying on Lingle, Judge Mansmann stated that "[i]n order to
determine whether a party's state law claim is preempted per section 301,
we look to see whether the resolution of the claim depends on the mean-
ing, or requires the interpretation, of a collective bargaining agree-
ment."180 In Antol, Judge Mansmann stated that one need only look to the
appendix of the collective bargaining agreement to determine remunera-
174. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (stating that Supreme Court "stressed
that it is the legal character of the claim as 'independent' of rights under the
collective bargaining agreement that decides whether a state cause of action may
go forward").
175. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S.
107, 124 (1994)).
176. See id. at 1123 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("Both state laws grant a right
of compensation for earned wages, including vacation pay.").
177. See id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (" 'The right to recover wages "earned"
by the plaintiffs/employees upon separation from employment is a statutory rem-
edy which supplements (rather than supplants) a common law cause of action for
breach of contract."' (quoting Adam v. Benjamin, 627 A.2d 1186,1192 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993))).
178. See id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting). Accordingly, Judge Mansmann stated:
The Majority attempts to distinguish Livadas' case from this case because
the Supreme Court in Livadas found that there was no dispute between
Livadas and her employer over the amount of the penalty to which
Livadas was entitled. I do not believe, however, that federal preemption
can turn on whether or not an employer chooses to dispute the amount
of wages an employee is entitled, under state law, to receive.
Id.
179. See id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (finding that dispute as to alleged enti-
tlement to compensation and benefits was not implicated by specific provisions of
collective bargaining agreement).
180. Id. at 1123-24 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988)).
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tion on a daily and hourly basis by job classification. 181 Judge Mansmann
therefore asserted that in order to determine the wages owed to the plain-
tiffs, no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was neces-
sary, and the plaintiffs' state law claims should not have been preempted
by section 301.182
Finally, as a matter of policy, Judge Mansmann noted that the plain-
tiffs could not receive what they were owed through arbitration because
the employer had declared bankruptcy. 183 Therefore, an assertion of this
state right could not interfere with the arbitration process, but only with
additional means of recourse under unusual circumstances.1 84
V. PRACTITIONER'S NOTES
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have
established rules that a practitioner must face when attempting to litigate
suits that involve rights articulated in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.18 5 First, section 301 has been interpreted as authorizing federal
courts to create a substantive body of federal common law.18 6 Although
181. See id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (stating that "[r]ecovery of these wages
is expressly provided for by Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law" and
that in order to determine amount of wages former employees of Shannopin Min-
ing Company were owed, "a court need only consult the appendix of the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ... at the conclusion of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, which sets forth the remuneration that employees are to receive on
a daily and hourly basis by job classification").
182. See id. at 1124 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) ("Since the resolution of these
employees' claims for unpaid wages does not depend upon the meaning, or re-
quire the interpretation, of a collective bargaining agreement, their claims should
not be preempted here.")
183. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("It is important to note that the em-
ployees involved in this case could not receive their duly earned wages from the
company through the arbitration process because the company was in bankruptcy
.... .).
184. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 301 preemption
requirement should not apply in situation such as bankruptcy).
185. For a detailed discussion of the development and application of the rules
of section 301 preemption, see supra notes 23-123 and accompanying text.
186. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957)
(stating that section 301 provides basis upon which federal courts take jurisdiction
and apply procedural rules of section 301(b) of LMRA); Antol, 100 F.3d at 1115
(discussing that, although section 301 refers only to jurisdiction, Supreme Court
has interpreted section 301 as allowing federal courts to create body of common
law for governance of collective bargaining agreements); Herman, supra note 23,
at 604-05 ("In 1957, a divided Court began to pour meaning into section 301 when
it held in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills that '[section] 301 (a) is more than jurisdic-
tional-that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal [common] law
for the enforcement of ... collective bargaining agreements and includes within
that federal law specific promises to arbitrate grievances.'" (quoting Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. at 450-51)); Lane, supra note 46, at 1282-83 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Lincoln Mills); Lyons, supra note 3, at 331-32 ("Under section 301 pre-
emption jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for consis-
tency and uniformity in the interpretation and application of collective bargaining
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state court jurisdiction is not removed, the application of state law that
provides rights to an aggrieved employee is preempted to the extent to
which it contradicts federal common law. 18 7 Section 301 covers claims
both by union and individual employee plaintiffs and preempts certain
tort actions brought by employees covered under collective bargaining
agreements. 188 Second, any state law cause of action that is "substantially
agreements."). One commentator stated: "In order to ensure this consistency, the
Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 to require the development of a fed-
eral common law with respect to collective bargaining agreements." Id. (citations
omitted); see Stein, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of
section 301 as authorizing federal courts to create governing body of federal com-
mon law for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements); White, supra note
78, at 379 (stating that on its face, language of section 301 is deceptively simple
and explaining Supreme Court's contrary substantive interpretation); Yates, supra
note 7, at 484-85 (discussing Supreme Court's ruling that section 301 is more than
jurisdictional as it empowers federal courts with ability to create federal common
law).
187. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
103-04 (1962) (discussing federal preemption of state law in adjudication of collec-
tive bargaining agreement issues as necessary because of need for uniformity in law
and possibility of disruptive effect upon negotiation and administration of collec-
tive bargaining agreements if individual contract terms were allowed to be given
different meaning under state and federal law); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1962) (holding that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over section 301 claims, but failing to decide choice of law question of
whether state court must apply state or federal law when deciding section 301 suit);
Herman, supra note 23, at 605 (discussing Lucas Flour Court's decision that federal
common law must govern in suits brought in state courts under section 301);
White, supra note 78, at 377 ("This statute has long been interpreted as ousting
state law claims for breach of contract when the contract involved is a collective
bargaining agreement."); Abraham, supra note 4, at 739, 746 (discussing Lucas
Flour and noting doctrine of preemption is that certain matters are of such na-
tional character and importance that federal laws take precedence over state laws);
Lane, supra note 46, at 1284 (discussing Lucas Flour decision generally and stating
"[t] he Court clarified the section 301 mandate by finding that federal rules of law
apply regardless of the forum in which the suit is adjudicated"). One commenta-
tor noted: "'Justice Stewart noted the compelling need for a comprehensive and
uniform body of federal substantive law to foster the process of 'free and voluntary
collective bargaining [that] is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote in-
dustrial peace."' Id. (quoting Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104); see Marcus, supra note
84, at 214-15 (discussing Lucas Flour holding as straightforward because "states can-
not use local rules to resolve breach" of collective bargaining agreements, but not-
ing that when claim does not involve breach of contract but still implicates
collective bargaining agreement there has been confusion over how to apply sec-
tion 301 preemption).
188. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962) (stating that
section 301 individual and union employee claims are allowable and such claims
are consistent with congressional policy of administration of collective bargaining
agreements under uniform federal law); White, supra note 78, at 382 & n.28 (stat-
ing that Supreme Court recognized that section 301 permits suits by individuals,
not just unions and employers, who claim breach of collective bargaining agree-
ment and noting "[t]he extension of section 301 to individuals claiming a breach
of their collective bargaining agreements, necessarily means that section 301 dis-
places any state law breach of contract action"); Yates, supra note 7, at 485 (discuss-
ing Smith Court's extension of section 301 to individual employees' claims).
1997] CASEBRIEF 2029
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dependent" upon analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is preempted by section 301.189 Third, and conversely, section 301
preemption is not triggered when a state law claim can be resolved without
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.1 90 Fourth and
finally, section 301 preemption may not be triggered when an issue is tan-
gential to, and requires only limited interpretation of, the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 19 t
Although the Third Circuit has applied section 301 on an ad hoc ba-
sis, it has defined independent and tangential issues narrowly in its most
recent decision.' 9 2 In doing so, the Third Circuit suggests that a mere
189. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3
(1987) (stating that, in state law tort claim, union's breach of duty.of care was
preempted by section 301 because it was substantially dependent on union's obli-
gations as delineated in collective bargaining agreement). "The rule there set
forth is that, when a state-law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement, a plaintiff may not evade the pre-emptive force of
§ 301 of the LMRA by casting the suit as a state-law claim." Id.; see Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1985) (stating as general rule that any state
law cause of action that is "substantially dependent" on analysis of terms of collec-
tive bargaining agreement is preempted by section 301); Stein, supra note 3, at 6
(stating Supreme Court has indicated that real question in section 301 preemption
is whether resolution of state law claim depends on collective bargaining agree-
ment); Lane, supra note 46, at 1287-88 (discussing holding and language of Lueck's
"substantial dependence" test).
190. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (stating that
plaintiff covered by collective bargaining agreement is allowed to assert legal rights
independent of agreement); see also United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362,
369 (1990) (noting that Lueck "held that a state-law tort action against an employer
may be pre-empted by § 301 if the duty to the employee of which the tort is a
violation is created by a collective-bargaining agreement and without existence in-
dependent of the agreement"); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 (stating that not every dis-
pute concerning employment or tangentially implicating term or provision of
collective bargaining agreement is preempted by section 301).
191. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12
(1988) (stating that not every dispute which tangentially implicates provision of
collective bargaining agreement is preempted by section 301); Marcus, supra note
84, at 210-11 (noting that Lingle stated resolution of state law claim "does not re-
quire construing the collective bargaining agreement" and finding that Supreme
Court's language in Lueck indicates that claims requiring any interpretation or
analysis of collective bargaining agreement are "dependent" and, therefore, pre-
empted); Stein, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that Supreme Court in Lingle left issue
of how much contract interpretation was too much in confused state by dropping.
word "substantial" from dependence test and then bringing it up later in footnote
as well as in later opinion); White, supra note 78, at 410-414 (discussing Lingle
Court's decision and circumstances under which claim may or may not be pre-
empted in favor of federal common law); Lyons, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing
Lingle decision not to preempt state law claims that only tangentially implicated
provision of collective bargaining agreement as based in part on reasoning that
Congress intended to maintain minimum state labor standards after passage of
federal labor law).
192. SeeAntol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1996) (deciding case in
which Third Circuit faced determining how much interpretation of terms of col-
lective bargaining agreement was too much, thereby triggering section 301 pre-
emption). The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs entitlement to compensation
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need to view a collective bargaining agreement for the calculation of dam-
ages may result in the preemption of a state law cause of action. 19 3 Fur-
thermore, the Third Circuit has held that under section 301, employers
can be held liable only in their corporate capacity and not as individu-
als. 194 Finally, the practitioner must be aware that the mere reliance on a
collective bargaining agreement as a defense to a state law cause of action
does not result in section 301 preemption. 195
In the normal course of events, section 301 of the LMRA will be impli-
cated following a unionized employee's commencement of suit against his
or her employer in which the employee alleges that the employer violated
state law.1 96 Upon commencement of such a suit, corporate counsel for
was disputed and could not be resolved without an analysis of the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1117.
193. See id. at 1123 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting that preemption in
this situation appears to be what Livadas Court was trying to circumvent).
194. See id. at 1120 (holding that employers cannot be held liable as individu-
als under section 301). The Third Circuit stated that if the state law's broad defini-
tion of the term "employer" were applied to the federal law, a number of adverse
effects would follow. See id. First, the long-standing insulation of officers from
personal liability for corporate debts would be removed. See id. Second, a broad
definition of the term "employer" that extended to corporate officers in their indi-
vidual capacity would also allow employees to bypass both the grievance proce-
dures established by the collective bargaining agreement and the section 301
federal statute of limitations. See id.
195. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 (stating that presence or absence of federal
question jurisdiction is controlled by well-pleaded complaint rule which provides
for federal jurisdiction only when federal question is presented on face of plain-
tiff's complaint and that this "rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he
or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law"); Stein,
supra note 3, at 13 (noting that Supreme Court in Caterpillar concluded claims are
not removable solely because employer asserts defense that depends on collective
bargaining agreement). One commentator noted that in contrast to the previous
understanding of preemption doctrine, the Caterpillar Court "held that in some
cases a section 301 preemption defense cannot serve as a basis for removal jurisdic-
tion." Id. The Supreme Court has stated that federal preemption is ordinarily
used as a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit and as such, it does not appear on
the face of a well-pleaded complaint nor does it authorize removal to federal court.
SeeJay judge, Chemical Firm Fails to Keep Suit Out of State Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Jan. 23, 1996, at 5 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)).
196. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 756 ("Typically, section 301 springs into
force following a unionized employee's commencement of suit against his em-
ployer alleging some form of employer misconduct grounded upon state laws
which prohibit the behavior."); see also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402 (commencing action
against employer alleging plaintiff had been discharged for exercising rights pro-
vided by Illinois state worker's compensation laws); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727 (1985) (bringing action, under Massachusetts
statute, to enforce statute against defendant insurers); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 206 (1985) (bringing state law tort action against employer
and insurer that administered disability insurance plan in accordance with collec-
tive bargaining agreement, seeking damages for bad faith in handling claim);
Antol, 100 F.3d at 1114 (filing complaint based on Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, seeking liquidated damages and attorney's fees as well as unpaid
wages); Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir.
1994) (filing complaint stating violation of state law, breach of contract and unfair
1997] CASEBRIEF' 2031
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the employer should first seek removal of the claim to federal district
court pursuant to the jurisdictional policy of section 301.197 Next, counsel
for the employer should file a motion for summary judgment based on the
employee's failure to exhaust the arbitration provisions.198 In the alterna-
tive, a motion for summary judgment may be grounded on the argument
that an application of state law would countermand federal labor law pol-
icy by "upsetting the uniformity and predictability established by the col-
lective bargaining system."1 9 9 Counsel for the employer must also
contend that the state law claim may only be resolved through, or is "sub-
stantially dependent" upon, an interpretation of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and, thus, is preempted in favor of the federal com-
mon law. 20 0 If counsel for the employer's motion is granted, the union
claim settlement); Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d 108, 110 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that defendant allegedly violated Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law by failing to pay plaintiff wages due to him); Angst v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1533 (3d Cir. 1992) (bringing suit against employer and union
alleging violations of state and federal law arising from breach of buyout plan
under which employees were promised lump sum and year of continued benefits
in exchange for voluntary departure).
197. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 756 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994)); see also
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402 (discussing defendant's removal of case to federal district
court on basis of diversity of citizenship and filing motion to dismiss or stay pro-
ceedings based on section 301 preemption doctrine); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 206 (filing
cross-motion for summaryjudgment on ground of section 301 preemption); Antol,
100 F.3d at 1114 (removing case to federal court asserting that contract of employ-
ment referred to in plaintiff's complaint was actually collective bargaining agree-
ment between union and corporation, and therefore, case was really action to
enforce terms of collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of LMRA);
Goepel, 36 F.3d at 308-09 (removing case "immediately" to federal district court
stating that case was removable pursuant to federal law); Angst, 969 F.2d at 1534
(arguing that district court had erred in not applying federal law to employees'
complaint and stating employees had failed to exhaust collective bargaining agree-
ment's internal grievance procedures).
198. See Angst, 969 F.2d at 1537 (holding that plaintiff must first exhaust griev-
ance and arbitration procedure under collective bargaining procedure before
bringing state law action); Labor Management Relations Act: Independent State-Law
Claims, N.Y. LJ., May 25, 1990, at 21 (stating that before action can proceed under
section 301, employee must exhaust grievance procedures provided by collective
bargaining agreement).
199. Abraham, supra note 4, at 756-57; see Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410-11 (discuss-
ing Court's holding that state tort remedy was not preempted by section 301 as
"consistent both with the policy of fostering uniform, certain adjudication of dis-
putes over the meaning of collective-bargaining agreements and with cases that
have permitted separate fonts of substantive rights to remain unpre-empted by
other federal labor-law statutes"); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219 (explaining need to pre-
serve effectiveness of arbitration as one of central reasons that supports Supreme
Court's holding in Lucas Flour); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (discussing policy behind federal labor law); Labor
Management Relations Act: Independent State-Law Claims, supra note 198, at 21 ("The
Supreme Court has held that the federal interest in uniform interpretation of col-
lective bargaining agreements may preempt certain state-law tort actions.").
200. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (explaining that, as general rule, state law claim
that is "substantially dependent" upon analysis of terms of collective bargaining
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employee will be completely deprived from asserting his or her state law
action.2 0 1 Application of the federal common law and its six-month stat-
agreement is preempted by section 301); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (stating that state law tort claim alleging
union breached duty of care was preempted by section 301 because it was substan-
tially dependent on union's obligations as set forth in collective bargaining agree-
ment). The Supreme Court noted in Hechler that when a state law claim is
substantially dependent on analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the plaintiff may not evade the preemptive force of section 301 by bringing
the suit as a state law claim. Id. For this reason, counsel for the defendant will
always claim that a plaintiff's state law claim may only be resolved through or is
substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402 (discussing district court's dismissal of com-
plaint based on contention that claim for retaliatory discharge was "inextricably
intertwined" with collective bargaining provision and that allowing state law action
to proceed would undermine arbitration procedures set forth in contract); Antol,
100 F.3d at 1115 (discussing defendants' argument that plaintiffs' claims are based
on breach of collective bargaining agreement and determination of wages and
benefits due would require interpreting agreement, necessitating federal preemp-
tion of state law claim); Goepel, 36 F.3d at 309 (discussing defendant's removal and
argument for preemption based on contention that plaintiff's breach of contract
claim was governed by federal law and other state law claims were "inextricably
intertwined" with breach of contract claim)" Angst, 969 F.2d at 1533 (agreeing with
defendant that on face of employees' complaint alone, resolution of employees'
claims against defendant required interpretation of collective bargaining agree-
ment and any modification of said agreement and concluding that federal labor
law preempted state law claims); Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1989)
("CBS responds that Berda's claims are based on an alleged individual contract
that is inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and that
the claims substantially depend on interpretation of the collective agreement.").
For instance in Berda, CBS "contend[ed] that the claims [were] preempted by the
collective bargaining agreement and that the action must be brought, if at all,
under section 301 of the LMRA." Id.
201. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (providing rule under which state law claim
requiring analysis of collective bargaining agreement for resolution whether
framed in contract or tort must be treated as claim brought under section 301 or
be dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law); Abraham, supra note 4,
at 757 & n.115 ("Only claims alleging a breach of the collective agreement and
exhaustion of internal grievance procedures are permissible under Section 301.");
see also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983)
(applying six-month statute of limitations to federal common law actions under
LMRA). It should be noted that plaintiffs who are deprived from asserting their
state rights often cannot bring federal action because six-month statute of limita-
tion has run, or alternatively, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy arbitration and griev-
ance procedures. See Berda, 881 F.2d at 22 (discussing district court's holding that
plaintiffs could not maintain suit as LMRA suit because six-month statute of limita-
tions expired); see also Hechler, 481 U.S. at 862 (holding that plaintiff is precluded
from bringing state law claim due to federal preemption); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220
(holding that state law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of terms of
collective bargaining agreement and must be treated as section 301 claim or be
dismissed); Anto4 100 F.3d at 1114 (holding that because state claims are based
squarely on collective bargaining agreement, plaintiffs' state law action was pre-
empted by LMRA); Wheeler, 985 F.2d at 113 (holding that plaintiff's state law claims
are based on terms of collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, are exclu-
sively governed by federal law, and further noting that, although plaintiff could
have brought action under section 301, he was first required to make use of griev-
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ute of limitations will likely result in the termination of the plaintiff's
case.
202
When counsel for the employer seeks removal of the claim to federal
district court pursuant to section 301, counsel for the employee plaintiff
must first argue that preemption under section 301 is inappropriate for
the case at bar. This may be done by showing that satisfaction of the em-
ployee's state law claim is not "substantially dependent" upon an interpre-
tation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 20 3 Instead,
counsel for the employee should contend either that a narrow definition
of "dependence" would best suit a proper balance between federalism and
ance and arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreement, which he
failed to do); Angst, 969 F.2d at 1537 (holding that federal law governs portion of
plaintiffs' suit originally brought as state law action).
202. See Herman, supra note 23, at 617-18 & n.105 (discussing suit in which
defendant moved for summary judgment on basis that six-month statute of limita-
tions under section 301 had run and noting that if "the case is held within § 301 or
preempted by federal labor law, then wrongful discharge plaintiffs, when suing
both the union and employer in a 'hybrid' breach of contract-duty of fair represen-
tation action, face a six month statute of limitations"); Yates, supra note 7, at 484
("The employer has a distinct advantage when the federal court of removal treats
the state law claims as preempted by section 301. With the panoply of procedural
defenses to section 301 actions available to employers, few cases converted to sec-
tion 301 actions survive the opening round of dispositive motions."); see also Hech-
ler, 481 U.S. at 864-66 & n.6 (noting DelCostello's application of six-month statute of
limitation to section 301 actions and stating that, if plaintiff's case is under section
301, court must determine whether claim is time barred by applicable six-month
statute of limitations); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169-72 (applying six-month statute of
limitations to federal common law actions under LMRA); Berda, 881 F.2d at 22
(discussing district court's holding that plaintiffs could not maintain suit as LMRA
suit because it was not filed within six-month statute of limitations); Malia v. RCA
Corp., 794 F.2d 909, 913 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's holding that
plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by section 301 and stating that "[g]iven
this conclusion, the district court's decision concerning the statute of limitations is
irrelevant. The six-month statute of limitations applicable to claims under § 301 of
the LMRA does not govern state-law contract and tort claims").
203. See Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-97 (1987) (holding
that section 301 preemption is not triggered when state law claim can be resolved
without interpretation of terms of collective bargaining agreement). In Caterpillar,
the plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted because they were not substan-
tially dependent on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 387. This idea was extended in Lingle, in which the Supreme Court held that
when an issue is tangential to and only requires a limited interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, federal common law may not preempt a state law
cause of action. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12. The Lingle Court determined that the
plaintiffs state law claim was not preempted, although the Court needed to look at
the collective bargaining agreement to determine benefits and damages. Id. at
407. Moreover, in Livadas, the Supreme Court noted that "we were clear that
when the meaning of the contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact
that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state law
litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished." Livadas v. Brad-
shaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994).
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state rights or that the reasons for which federal common law was created
are not implicated by the employee's case.
20 4
If, however, the employee's claim is held to be preempted by section
301, the employee must satisfy many procedural requirements in order to
prevail. 20 5 The employee must first exhaust all grievance and arbitration
procedures under the collective bargaining agreement.20 6 Next, counsel
204. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 122-23 (noting that section 301 should not be
read too broadly to preempt nonnegotiable state rights conferred on individual
employees as matter of state law and stating that preemption should only be ap-
plied to ensure that "the purposes animating § 301" are not frustrated); Antol, 100
F.3d at 1124 (MansmannJ., dissenting) (noting that aggrieved employees in case
could not receive earned wages through arbitration process because company was
bankrupt and arguing that uniform policy in favor of arbitration would not be
disturbed by permitting Pennsylvania state law action that allows employees of
bankrupt company additional means of redress); Abraham, supra note 4, at 761
("The preemption of virtually any derivative tort claim arising out of an industrial
relationship is inconsistent with the fact that Congress had not intended to occupy
the entire field of labor law."); see also Marcus, supra note 84, at 225-30 (discussing
problems with current approach to section 301 and arguing for new approach to
federal preemption claims); Stein, supra note 3, at 2 (arguing "current preemption
scheme should largely be discarded to avoid federal interference with legitimate
state interests and to be fairer to individual employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements"); Yates, supra note 7, at 494 (discussing delicate balance sec-
tion 301 preemption seeks to strike between need for uniformity in federal labor
law and protection of individual's rights under independent state law).
205. See Yates, supra note 7, at 483 (discussing how plethora of procedural
requirements placed on plaintiff in section 301 actions "plays directly into the
hands of employers").
206. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981) ("An employee seeking a
remedy for an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement between his
[or her] union and employer must attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and
arbitration procedures established by that agreement before he [or she] may
maintain a suit against his union or employer under § 301 (a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act."); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562
(1976)' ("Courts are not to usurp those functions which collective-bargaining con-
tracts have properly 'entrusted to the arbitration tribunal."' (quoting United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960))); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) ("[11f the wrongfully discharged employee himself
[or herself] resorts to the courts before the grievance procedures have been fully
exhausted, the employer may well defend on the ground that the exclusive reme-
dies by such a contract have not been exhausted."); Republic Steel Corp. v. Mad-
dox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965) (holding that as general federal rule that
individual employees who wish to assert contract grievances must attempt use of
collective bargaining agreement grievance procedure agreed upon by employer
and union as method of redress applicable to severance-pay grievances and pre-
cluding employee who had not exhausted grievance procedures established by
agreement from instituting state lawsuit to recover severance pay under agreement
pursuant to LMRA); United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83 (discussing exhaustion
of grievance and arbitration procedures); Angst, 969 F.2d at 1537 ("Under federal
labor law, aggrieved employees must exhaust their [collective bargaining agree-
ment's] grievance and arbitration procedures before filing a complaint in federal
court 'unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.'" (quoting United
Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83)); Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,
776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Federal labor policy requires employees to ex-
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for the employee must file suit within the six-month statute of limitations
period. 20 7 Finally, counsel for the employee must prove a breach of both
the collective bargaining agreement and the union's duty of fair
representation. 20 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Although preemption doctrine under section 301 of the LMRA has
been visited often both by the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, it still
remains vague in many aspects of its application. 20 9 Such uncertainty has
left the practitioner with room to argue his or her case, but this room to
haust any grievance procedure provided in the union's collective bargaining agree-
ment when that agreement governs the manner in which the employee's rights
may be enforced."); Labor Management Relations Act: Independent State-Law Claims,
supra note 198, at 21 (stating that before bringing section 301 action, employee
must first exhaust grievance procedures provided by relevant collective bargaining
agreement); see also James A. Burstein & Carmel Sella, Sexual Harassment's Second
Generation: The Harasser as "Victim," 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 153, 158 (1995) (report-
ing that defamation claim based on coworkers' allegations of sexual harassment
was preempted by section 301 when collective bargaining agreement required
union and employer to identify and resolve sexual harassment complaints through
contractual grievance-arbitration procedures).
207. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169-72 (holding that section 10(b) of National
Labor Relations Act, which establishes six-month period for making charges of
unfair labor practices to National Labor Relations Board, is federal statute of limi-
tations designed to accommodate balance of interests very similar to that sought by
LMRA and therefore governs suits under LMRA section 301); Herman, supra note
23, at 617-18 (noting case in which defendant moved for summaryjudgment, alleg-
ing six-month statute of limitations under section 301 had run) (citing Garibaldi v.
Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984); Yates, supra note 7, at 484 ("The
employer has a distinct advantage when the federal court of removal treats the
state law claims as preempted by section 301. With the panoply of procedural
defenses to section 301 actions available to employers, few cases converted to sec-
tion 301 actions survive the opening round of dispositive motions."); see also Hech-
ler, 481 U.S. at 864-66 & n.6 (noting DelCostello's application of six-month statute of
limitation to section 301 actions and stating that, if plaintiffs case is under section
301, court must determine whether claim is time barred by applicable six-month
statute of limitations); Berda, 881 F.2d at 22 (discussing district court's holding that
plaintiffs could not maintain suit as LMRA suit because six-month statute of limita-
tions expired); Malia, 794 F.2d at 913 (reversing district court's holding that plain-
tiff's state law claims were preempted by section 301 and stating "[g]iven this
conclusion, the district court's decision concerning the statute of limitations is ir-
relevant. The six-month statute of limitations applicable to claims under § 301 of
the LMRA does not govern state-law contract and tort claims.").
208. See Yates, supra note 7, at 483-84 ("To prevail in a section 301 action, a
plaintiff must initially exhaust collective bargaining grievance procedures, then file
suit within a six-month period of limitation, and ultimately prove a breach of both
the collective bargaining agreement and the union's duty of fair representation."
(citations omitted)).
209. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 n.18 (noting courts of appeals have not been
consistent in their interpretation and application of section 301 preemption);
Stein, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing how confusion in proper application of sec-
tion 301 has sparked controversy in lower courts); Abraham, supra note 4, at 764
("The Supreme Court has set forth a rule that is vague and quite open-ended. As
the rule stands, there is tremendous room for manipulation in its application.");
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argue is gained at the expense of predictability. 2 10  Although both
Supreme Court and Third Circuit jurisprudence establish certain rules
that a practitioner must follow when attempting to avoid or invite section
301 preemption, section 301's attempt to strike a "delicate balance be-
tween the need for uniformity in federal labor law and the protection of
individuals' rights under independent state law concepts" 211 will be better
met by a clarification of the exact limits of "dependence" and section
301.212
Joshua H. Grabar
Lyons, supra note 3, at 339 ("The balance between minimum state rights and sec-
tion 301 principles remains unclear under this vague standard.").
210. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 764 ("As the rule stands, there is tremen-
dous room for manipulation in its application.").
211. Yates, supra note 7, at 494.
212. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 764-65 (asserting that preemption doctrine
is problematic because vague and open-ended Supreme Court rulings have re-
sulted in inconsistent application and stating "the Supreme Court should attempt
to clarify the exact limits of section 301 preemption and the areas to which the
state has the most significant interest in protecting its citizens"); Lane, supra note
46, at 1307 ("The new test of section 301 preemption potentially undercuts the
effectiveness of the collective bargaining and arbitration process that remains cen-
tral to the federal scheme of labor relations."); see also Marcus, supra note 84, at 219
(noting that Lueck Court stressed that "'[t]he full scope of the pre-emptive effect
of federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis"'
(quoting Allis-Chalmers'Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985))). Marcus noted
that "[t]he interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that
labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the
meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpreta-
tion." Id. at 228 (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211); see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125
n.18 (noting that courts of appeals have not been uniform in their understanding
and application of concepts delineated in Lingle and Lueck, but refusing to resolve
disagreements over proper scope of aforementioned decisions); Stein, supra note
3, at 5-7 (discussing Supreme Court's shifts among different tests for preemption,
litigation caused by lack of clarity in preemption doctrine and need for reform in
section 301 preemption).
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